Goldreich, O. (2001). Foundations of Cryptography, Volume 1: Basic Tools. Cambridge University Press. DOI 10.1017/CBO9780511546891
Key takeaways
Skimmed (NOTE-863). In the 1995 draft of Volume 1, computational indistinguishability is a strictly coarser equivalence than statistical closeness, and the book proves this two ways. Proposition 3.3 does it unconditionally: a counting argument shows there are ensembles supported on at most 2^(n/2) strings that no circuit of size 2^(n/8) tells from uniform with gap 2^(−n/8) or more, but such an ensemble cannot be sampled efficiently. §3.3.1 shows that the output of any pseudorandom generator is statistically far from uniform yet, by definition, indistinguishable from it. That witness is efficiently samplable, and it needs pseudorandom generators, which exist if and only if one-way functions do (Theorem 3.29, stated without proof). That efficient post-processing preserves indistinguishability is set as Exercise 1 of §3.8.4, not proved in the text. All of this is asymptotic, about ensembles indexed by n, not about single pairs of distributions.
Why this is here
A15 drew on Goldreich for the separation of statistical from computational distinguishability. It supplies the definitions CLAIM-302 and CLAIM-304 rest on, and the construction CASE-083 uses. The two claims are the record’s own derivations from the definition of a secure generator, so this is cited for definitions, not read for evidence.