nucleation

LIT-1987: Contextual Emergence in the Description of Properties

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Properties4
StatusUnfetched — looked for 2026-11-03, not read. A lawful free copy, the authors' preprint on PhilSci-Archive, is at https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/2934/1/embishFinalArchive.pdf (record philsci-archive.pitt.edu/2934). This client could not fetch it: curl through the session proxy failed TLS verification ('unable to get local issuer certificate') (the http address fared the same), a second fetcher got HTTP 503, and two Wayback captures (20240613145841, 20100708050954) reset the connection. The Springer version is paywalled; CORE's copy sits behind a Cloudflare check, which was not passed. It stays Unfetched until the owner supplies the file.
Version2
Tagsphilosophy-of-science, complex-systems
Cited as “source” byTHEORY-1314 — Contextual emergence, on which an emergent phenomenon's parts are necessary but not sufficient, needs a functional boundary between the phenomenon and its context, without which the context could be folded into the base and the account collapse into weak emergence or global supervenience; and the subject of attention is contextually emergent in this sense, its boundary being the skull, meninges and brain stem, so that its macro-level patterns constrain micro-level activity with a power that is not reducible to the parts and needs neither downward nor circular causation

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Bishop, R. C., Atmanspacher, H. (2006). Contextual Emergence in the Description of Properties. Foundations of Physics, 36(12), 1753-1777. doi:10.1007/s10701-006-9082-8.

Key takeaways

Not read. A lawful copy exists on PhilSci-Archive but could not be fetched (status note). Bishop’s later statement of the view is read in NOTE-1535 (THEORY-1333).

Standing in the record

The account of contextual emergence Jennings’s paper is reported to use. It claims stability conditions that make a higher-level description well defined, not new causal powers; that is the point of contact with CLAIM-334.

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