NOTE-105: Dorato — Events and the Ontology of Quantum Mechanics

Contribution

Dorato proposes an ontology of events as a common primitive ontology for all three primitive-ontology formulations of quantum mechanics (GRWf, GRWm, Bohmian mechanics). He argues that the same ontology serves the main wave-function-antirealist views (Bohr, Rovelli’s RQM, Haag, Pashby). He then criticises the Esfeld et al. (2013, 2015) package of bare matter points individuated by metrical relations plus a holistic power of the universal configuration. His alternative is intrinsic dispositions carried by events.

Key insight

Primitive-ontology theories and ψ-antirealist views disagree about ψ but agree that something happens at points or regions of spacetime. If “events” names that common thing, one category spans the rival interpretations and connects to the manifest image, which is full of happenings in temporal order. Any realism about ψ that is still needed is then better placed in powers of those events than in a single global power of the universe’s configuration.

Assumptions

• The Sellars–Suppes programme: philosophy of physics must (1) give a precise ontology for a precise theory, (2) describe the relevant manifest image, and (3) reconcile the two (pp. 2–3).
• Event-primitivism is coherent. Objects are “more or less monotonous collections of events”, and dispositions can be grounded in events because stimulus and manifestation are both events (p. 4). Meyer’s (2013) classification of event theories (Quine/Lemmon, Lewis, Kim, Chisholm) is used without adjudication. All of them presuppose spacetime.
• Objective becoming: the “successive, irreversible, worldline-dependent occurrence of events” gives local becoming even in SR and GR (pp. 3–4).
• GRWm’s matter field is taken as a “kosher” field: a definite density value assigned to regions (p. 7, after Kuhlmann 2014).
• Dispositionalism is taken as the working realist reading of ψ in §5, following Esfeld et al. 2013 (“laws are made true by powers”).

Key results

This is a philosophy paper; the results are argued claims.

• §3 (pp. 5–7). GRWf is a Bell-style “galaxy of events” (p. 5). In GRWm, a contraction of the matter density is an event, and the field itself is either (i) all there is, (ii) a set of events, or (iii) a substance that can be re-conceived as a collection of events. Every listed theory of events covers it (p. 7). In Bohmian mechanics, particles at points are events and worldlines are processes (p. 7).
• §3.1 (pp. 7–9). Events differ from Esfeld et al.’s matter points only if at least one of conditions (i)–(iii) fails. Dorato keeps intrinsic powers, so (iii) fails.
• §4 (pp. 9–12). In Bohr and in RQM the ontology is outcomes or interactions, which are located events. In Haag (2013) the “event” is an independent primary concept tied to spacetime. In Pashby (2014), via Hegerfeldt’s theorem, localisation should be read as events occurring, not as properties possessed. Adding GRW’s precise account of “interaction” to RQM yields GRW flashes or matter-density contractions (p. 10).
• §4 summary (p. 12). Events are “necessary both in realistic and in antirealistic views of the wave function”. Dorato also calls a bare-matter-point ontology “too sparse to be worthy of that name”.
• §5 (pp. 13–15). (a) A holistic power of the whole configuration, carried by relata with no intrinsic power, is of unclear intelligibility. The fix is to give each particle an intrinsic power that helps give rise to the holistic one. (b) For Bohmian spin, the proper analogue of fragility is “the disposition to have a definite spin in a given direction” in a measurement context (pp. 13–14). (c) The effective wave function: when a subsystem is effectively decoupled, the masses in its Hamiltonian must be intrinsic dispositions of that subsystem’s particles. So Esfeld et al. “need to alter the ontology” when they move from the universal to the effective ψ, while intrinsic event-dispositions need no change (pp. 14–15).

Claims

id	claim	strength	support
C1	An event ontology fits GRWf, GRWm and Bohmian mechanics	moderate	conceptual argument, §3 (pp. 5–7). It shows compatibility, not that events are needed
C2	Events are the best bridge between the manifest and scientific images	weak	informal argument, §2. It rests on a contested thesis of objective becoming (pp. 3–4)
C3	Events are “interpretation-independent” and necessary in both realist and antirealist views of ψ	weak	survey of four antirealist positions, §4 (pp. 9–12). Being shared is not shown to make events necessary
C4	The difference from Esfeld et al. could be “purely verbal” if conditions (i)–(iii) held	strong (a concession)	stated, p. 8
C5	A holistic power carried by relata with no intrinsic powers risks unintelligibility	weak	informal argument, p. 13. Offered as questions, “not … a definite rejection”
C6	Esfeld et al. must change their ontology between the universal and the effective ψ; intrinsic event-dispositions need not	moderate	argument from the effective-wave-function construction and the masses in H, pp. 14–15
C7	GRW and Bohm lack independent empirical confirmation, so treating the interaction as primitive (RQM) is methodologically reasonable for now	weak	historical analogy (19th-century mechanical ether models), pp. 10–11
C8	Bohmian particles have an intrinsic disposition to manifest spin in a measurement context	weak	analogy with fragility, pp. 13–14. Dorato calls it “intrinsic, even though reducible”

Concepts

• Event. Something whose “being is [its] happening”; idealised as point-like in spacetime theories (p. 3). Dorato does not choose among Quine/Lemmon (regions), Lewis (properties of regions), Kim (property exemplifications at times, extended to places) and Chisholm (states of affairs). He assumes only primitivism about events.
• Materia prima / matter points. Esfeld et al.’s (2015) bare substances with no intrinsic properties, individuated by metrical relations (fn. 8). Dorato calls this a “moderate structural realism”.
• Holistic dispositionalism. The view that ψ refers to a law-grounding power of the configuration of all particles in the universe (Esfeld et al. 2013).
• Generosity principle. Crediting particles with some intrinsic properties, e.g. mass and charge, instead of packing them all into ψ (Brown et al. 1996).
• Two brands of ψ-antirealism. (a) Outcomes or interactions are the ontology (Bohr, Rovelli). (b) Events are forced by the failure of a particle ontology (Haag, Pashby).

Connections

The paper sits between Chen’s taxonomy of wave-function realisms (LIT-204) and Allori’s functionalism (LIT-200). The dispositional reading of ψ links it to Vetter on dispositions (LIT-109). Belot’s particle-in-a-box case against dispositional readings of the quantum state (LIT-100; noted in its reading) is directly relevant to §5, and Dorato does not address it. Rovelli (LIT-177) cites Dorato three times, as a defender of RQM, for the anti-monism of RQM, and for the “information is always information about something” point. Rovelli’s chapter treats RQM’s ontology as sparse relative events, which is Dorato’s first antirealist brand. Gao (LIT-121, ch. 3, fn. 5 p. 30) independently makes a related objection to Esfeld et al.: when the universal ψ factorises, the effective ψ of a subsystem does not encode the influence of other particles. That parallels Dorato’s objection from the effective wave function. PBR (LIT-062) is in Dorato’s reference list but is not discussed in the text.

Bearing on the record

• It supports treating the primitive-ontology and dispositional readings of ψ as one cluster in the record, alongside LIT-204, LIT-200 and LIT-100.
• Metaphysics: the paper defends event-primitivism, intrinsic dispositionalism, and objective local becoming as the bridge to the manifest image. It presupposes that a theory’s ontology is to be read off its primitive (spacetime) ontology.
• No ML-practice content. Nothing here bears on the Anthology of the SOTA.

Limitations

• The central “fit” claims show only that events are compatible with each theory. Dorato concedes the view may collapse into Esfeld’s (p. 8), and he defers the account of how events relate to powers (p. 15).
• The generality argument cuts both ways. Something every interpretation can host constrains none of them, so it cannot help choose between them.
• The antirealist section is a sketch of four positions in about three pages, and does not engage their critics.
• §5’s objections to Esfeld et al. are posed as questions. Nothing is proved against holistic dispositionalism.
• The methodological argument (C7) leans on one historical analogy.

Open questions

• Is an event with intrinsic dispositions anything more than a matter point with properties? The answer depends on the promised account of how events relate to powers.
• Can intrinsic dispositions of events reproduce the non-factorisable dynamics of entangled Bohmian systems without in effect reintroducing a holistic power? Belot’s (LIT-100) cases are the test.
• Does objective becoming survive once events are nonlocally correlated, as in GRWf and RQM?

Corrections to the seeded skim

• The dossier says the Esfeld comparison turns on events “also lack[ing] intrinsic powers”. The text (p. 8) gives three conditions under which the two views would differ only verbally: (i) spatiotemporal relations are identity-giving metrical relations between events; (ii) events are identified with substances; (iii) events have no intrinsic power or property. Dorato presses only (iii). He gives two differences: events are more general, because they also serve antirealist views of ψ; and particles should keep some intrinsic properties (the “generosity” principle of Brown et al. 1996 and Pylkkänen et al. 2014).
• The dossier leaves out §2’s actual premise. Events bridge the manifest and scientific images mainly because they “play a major role in making sense of the passage of time” (p. 3). Dorato ties this to objective, local, worldline-dependent becoming (Savitt, Dieks, Dorato 2006; pp. 3–4). The first argument therefore rests on a thesis in the metaphysics of time, not only on ordinary language.
• The dossier also leaves out a methodological turn in §4 (pp. 10–11). GRW and Bohm have “remarkable explanatory power” but no independent empirical evidence, and Dorato draws an analogy with 19th-century mechanical ether models. So “for the time being” one may follow RQM in taking the interaction Hamiltonian as primitive, with no further explanation owed (Kuhn). Much of the case that events beat materia prima rests on this, and it is a quasi-instrumentalist stance, not an ontological argument.
• Page ranges: §4 runs pp. 9–12, not 9–13; §5 runs pp. 13–15.
• Dorato explicitly endorses none of the theories he analyses (fn. 6, p. 5; p. 8). The paper argues that events fit each of them, not that any is true.
• Citation slips in the manuscript: Suppes is quoted as 1989 but listed as 1979 (the listed volume is Bogdan’s Patrick Suppes, Reidel, 1979). The text cites “Shaffner 2004”, but the list has Schaffner 1972. Esfeld et al. 2013 is listed as “forthcoming” in BJPS 64. The citations do not affect the argument.
• metaphysics tag: justified. The paper defends event-primitivism (objects as collections of events, dispositions grounded in events), intrinsic dispositionalism about ψ-related properties, and objective becoming.
• primary topic: metaphysics (suggested; currently quantum-foundations). The thesis is about which metaphysical category is fundamental, with quantum theories as the test cases. Leaving quantum-foundations first is also defensible.