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THEORY-904: Gollwitzer and Sheeran (2006) conclude, narratively from a handful of studies that measured or manipulated the goal intention, that implementation intentions affect performance only when the goal intention they serve is strong and activated, so the planned response is not elicited mechanically by its cue; in 2024, across eight tests, plan effects were larger with strong, activated or self-concordant goal intentions than with weak, unactivated or self-discordant ones (d = .79 for the difference), and in 31 physical-activity tests split at the median of intention, planning helped with strong intentions (d = .31) and had no effect with weak ones (d ≈ 0)

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Properties7
StatusActive
Version2
Tagsmotivation, behavioral-integration, self-governance
SourceLIT-1497 — Implementation Intentions and Goal Achievement: A Meta‐analysis of Effects and Processes, LIT-1488 — The when and how of planning: Meta-analysis of the scope and components of implementation intentions in 642 tests
Bears onQUESTION-314 — Is the response an implementation intention specifies gated by the goal intention it serves, so that with the goal deactivated or weak the cue alone does not produce it, and does the gate survive the plan's being acted on many times?
Cited as “corroborated by” byCLAIM-443 — A learned prior over which processes govern, P(g | z, H) ∝ exp(βQ(g, z) + b_H(g, z)), its bias b_H trained by reward-modulated Hebbian updates to the relations by which one process recruits or endorses another, is a candidate mechanism for durable authority and for amortized governance; but persistence is not amortization, which is shown only when earlier work replaces later computation, communication or recruitment, and a prior over authority differs from a prior over actions only when what is appropriate changes
Cited as “extends” byTHEORY-1176 — Implementation intentions affect performance only when the goal intention they serve is strong and activated, so the cue-triggered response is gated by the goal and does not fire on the cue alone

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Source

Gollwitzer & Sheeran, LIT-1497 (NOTE-1124), pp. 103–104; Sheeran, Listrom & Gollwitzer, LIT-1488 (NOTE-1131), Table 2 and p. 177.

What was actually shown

  • 2006, narratively (p. 103). Studies in which goal intentions were measured (Koestner et al. 2002b; Orbell et al. 1997; Sheeran et al. 2005c) found strong plan effects only with strong goal intentions; studies that primed or deactivated the goal (Bayer et al. 2004; Sheeran et al. 2005c, Study 2; Seehausen et al. 1994, cited through Gollwitzer 1996) found plans affected performance only with the goal active. “Thus, action control by implementation intentions does not involve a mechanistic elicitation of action in the presence of environmental cues but rather respects the presence versus absence of activated strong goal intentions” (p. 103).
  • 2024, across tests. Plan effects were larger when the goal intention was strong, activated or self-concordant than when it was not (d = .79, k = 8; Table 2). Among 31 physical-activity tests split at the median of reported intention, planning helped with strong intentions (d = .31) and “had no effect when intentions were weak” (p. 177).

What could have come out otherwise: plans could have produced the response on the cue whatever the state of the goal, which is what a cached cue-to-action link with no gate would do.

What this does not say

  • That plans adapt when the planned response is wrong. The 2006 authors say of a plan that fails or harms: “We do not know yet what happens” (p. 104). Gating by the goal is not revision of the mapping.
  • That the gate survives repetition. Repeated acting on a plan produced reported habit (Orbell & Verplanken 2005, cited p. 108); a habit may fire without the goal. Not tested here.
  • That the evidence is pooled. The 2006 conclusion is narrative; the 2024 moderator is between tests, k = 8.
  • That the gate is all-or-none. The 2024 figure is a difference between tests (d = .79, k = 8), not a null in the weak cells; only the physical-activity split found an effect near zero.

Connections

  • CLAIM-443. The claim contrasts a cached cue-to-action policy with a learned relation by which one process recruits another that can choose. This finding is a third arrangement between them: a cached mapping licensed by a higher-level state, the goal. It is closer to the claim’s prior over actions, since the goal decides whether, not what. The claim’s test, changing which action is appropriate, is the case the authors left open.
  • CLAIM-349. The goal keeps authority over whether the planned response is allowed to act; the plan’s own authority is conditional.

Note of 2026-10-30: the dropped clause

The old title’s evidence clause, “matched in 2024 by large plan effects under high motivation (d = .79, k = 8)”, was a mis-statement. Table 2’s d = .79 is the difference between plan effects with strong, activated or self-concordant goal intentions and with weak ones, over eight tests (LIT-1488, pp. 173, 177), not a plan effect under high motivation; NOTE-1131’s note of 2026-10-29 records the same correction. The clause is not kept as a proposal (ADR-047, kind 3). The old title’s general clause, the gate itself, which Gollwitzer and Sheeran assert, is kept as the Proposed reading THEORY-1176.

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