Proposed — not in force yet — an open question, so citing it as settled is the thing the report catches.
15 of 100 TERM documents. Back to the full index.
| # | Title | Summary | Status |
|---|---|---|---|
| TERM-063 v2 | agent, as an individual that is the active source of modulations of its coupling with its environment and regulates them against norms its own organization sets (Barandiaran, Di Paolo and Rohde) | THEORY-071’s three conditions (LIT-566, read in NOTE-458) as a candidate definition of “agent” beside TERM-044. The owner at U11 of the exchange of 2026-10-20 asked for “(potentially competing) TERM entries”; A11’s worked example was this one (“This entry could have rivals: [TERM-044] once filed”), and A12 and A14 kept it. It rivals TERM-044 because the two give different verdicts on cases the record holds: the thermostat with its designers and a trained policy’s training process pass TERM-044 and fail here. Proposed: recorded, not adopted. THEORY-071’s own promotion test would settle it. | Proposed |
| TERM-066 v5 | interpretive capture, of an organization’s evaluation: the condition in which the processes that read evidence, score constituents and allocate authority are driven by the interpretation or party being evaluated more than by evidence independent of it, so that authority amplifies or holds an interpretation without a gain in fidelity; judged against a standard specified apart from the captured process | The record uses “capture” in several entries (CLAIM-330, CLAIM-340, CLAIM-342, CLAIM-359, QUESTION-100, CLAIM-277) with no definition, and the exchange of 2026-10-20 used it at A20, A21, A22, A25 and A26 in two senses: a loop’s outcome, and an institution’s diversion from its purpose. Proposed: the first, with the second’s requirement of an outside standard. Not adopted; not concentration, and not merited trust. | Proposed |
| TERM-076 v2 | goal-conduciveness valence, organizational: a regime in which the negotiation among a system’s perspectives has, approximately, a potential, an ordering of the system’s own states by their bearing on its maintenance along which the moves that win its conflicts are improvements, persisting and restored after interruption; signed by whether the system runs ahead of or behind a reference course along that potential, and as intense as the negotiation’s decisions follow it rather than any rival ordering | The owner’s reframing of 2026-10-23: appraisal as the negotiation among competing perspectives, “common currency” as the negotiation admitting an (at least instantaneous) ordering, read in the ordinal sense (TERM-077), and hedonic valence as “a circumstance in which a particular kind of ordering dominates the dynamics”. Potential is read through Frijda’s three marks of control precedence (THEORY-055); the kind of ordering is one over the system’s own states by their bearing on its maintenance. Functional: it says nothing about whether the regime is felt. | Proposed |
| TERM-079 | belief, of a process: a maintained, truth-directed inferential commitment, held to the degree that the process uses a proposition as a premise in interpreting observations, generating expectations and evaluating counterfactuals across the contexts it bears on, together with the profile by which that commitment is revised; distinct from entertaining an interpretation, from asserting it, and from granting it authority over action | Proposed in the exchange of 2026-10-24 (workbench entry of 2026-10-24, U25), after the owner asked: “we have an operational characterization of feeling, wanting, liking… how about belief?” The record had accounts of what governs action and what is felt, and nothing comparable for belief. The candidate puts belief on the same footing, tested by its role in anticipation, inference and revision, not by report or by which motive wins. Not adopted. | Proposed |
| TERM-080 | collective intention, and which sense: participatory shared intention, institutionally constituted intention, or attributed collective intention | The owner’s, U12 of the exchange of 2026-10-26. A12’s sense map for an intention directed at a joint or group course of action, which several participants producing one outcome does not establish. The third sense is an observer’s attribution, not an instance of the first two. Rival criteria (Bratman, Gilbert, Tuomela, List and Pettit) are kept, not merged: the record holds all four, mostly unread. Used at once by the CECOT case, where two governments coordinated without one intention. Proposed. | Proposed |
| TERM-081 | moral worth, and which sense: intrinsic moral value, status-based dignity, or moral merit | The owner’s, U12 of the exchange of 2026-10-26. A12 would not let “moral worth” carry several meanings: the value a being has in itself, the respect owed to it by its status, and the praiseworthiness of its conduct. They come apart: blameworthy conduct does not lessen the respect owed, and an organization can produce valuable outcomes without a person’s standing. Standing itself is TERM-083. Proposed. | Proposed |
| TERM-082 v2 | consciousness, and which sense: phenomenal, access, self-consciousness or wakefulness | The owner’s, U12 of the exchange of 2026-10-26, quoting A11’s “None of these distinctions requires attributing consciousness, collective intention, or moral worth to the system”: “probably worth designing TERMs around these as well”. A12’s sense map, as a boundary: a claim about organization, access or self-modelling does not become a claim about experience by sharing a word with it. The senses are Block’s and the clinical one; the record reads Block in LIT-643. Proposed. | Proposed |
| TERM-083 v2 | moral standing: being owed moral consideration directly, for one’s own sake, and not only for one’s effects on others | The owner’s, U12 of the exchange of 2026-10-26. A12 split “moral worth” into this and a sense map (TERM-081). A claim of standing names its bearer, the interests or claims in question, the ground of standing and what follows. It does not entail consciousness as its only ground, collective agency, legal personhood or moral responsibility, and keeps moral patients apart from moral agents. Used at once by the Chagos case: the displaced are owed consideration whether or not they form one agent. Proposed. | Proposed |
| TERM-086 | organizational achievement, of a specified target: its attainment or maintenance, under declared conditions, where an identifiable arrangement of relations among components makes an explanatory difference that a comparison with admissible alternatives can show, as an episode, a maintained capacity or the reproduction of what sustains that capacity | The owner’s, U11 of the exchange of 2026-10-26: “we should probably engineer a TERM for ‘organizational achievement’, and/or terms in that neighborhood.” A11 found the phrase already doing work for authenticity, corrective capacity and effective action, and gave it a target-relative, causally discriminating definition with three modes. An attribution, not a compliment: a coercive apparatus can have one. Proposed: adoption is the owner’s. | Proposed |
| TERM-087 v3 | cut, and which sense: a Cartesian cut, Pattee’s epistemic cut, or Barad’s agential cut, enacted by an apparatus | Three senses of “cut” the exchange of 2026-10-27 used, which A9 §4 said “are not interchangeable concepts”. The Cartesian cut is a separation of observer from observed taken as given before any measurement. Pattee’s epistemic cut (LIT-1190, read in NOTE-952) is the functional separation of symbolic description from the dynamics it measures or controls, and is epistemic, not ontological. Barad’s agential cut (read first-hand only in her 2012 essay, LIT-1869; LIT-1653 and LIT-1657 unavailable) is a differentiation enacted within a phenomenon by an apparatus, through which boundaries and properties become determinate. Proposed: the record had no word for them, and they recur in CLAIM-476. | Proposed |
| TERM-088 | individuation, and which sense: descriptive (an inquiry can distinguish and track it), dynamical (its organization persists under specified dynamics and perturbation, with robust identity and boundaries), constitutive (its relational organization helps fix its identity and boundary), and organizational autonomy, the further achievement of contributing to the maintenance of its own constitutive constraints | A18 of the exchange of 2026-10-27 named four claims about a candidate individual and said they “are neither four necessary stages nor four universally ranked degrees of existence. They are different claims requiring different evidence”. A23 §VI split them further. The owner’s second review insisted that individuation not be read as requiring endogenous maintenance: “A persistent externally sustained pattern may still be a dynamically individuated entity.” This term lists the senses so that a claim saying “individual” says which. Organizational autonomy is TERM-070’s closure, named here as the sense it is not. Proposed. | Proposed |
| TERM-096 | group entity, as distinct from a category of members | A group entity is a collection taken as one bounded whole, by configural relations among its members, typically shared mental states; a category of members is a set whose members share a property and are, with respect to it, interchangeable. Membership in a category does not make someone part of a group entity, and the members of a group entity need not be alike. | Proposed |
| TERM-098 v2 | concept, as realized by an organization: a reusable, systematically consequential pattern of distinctions, applicable across a stated range of contexts with inferential or operational consequences; distinct from the feature or representation that carries it, from the organization that realizes it, and from what it is about, and distinct from conceptual corrigibility, the further capacity to find and revise its inadequacies | Filed at the owner’s decision of 2026-10-31, after the exchange “Analyze nucleation concepts” defined “concept” three times in three turns (A4, A5, A6). At the owner’s review, version 2 separates conceptual organization, which the term names, from conceptual corrigibility, a further achievement it does not require. A candidate, not adopted: QUESTION-360 asks what would settle it. | Proposed |
| TERM-099 | self-formation, of an agent: the production, by the agent’s own activity on a discrepancy it cannot yet resolve, of a maintained capacity, a new distinction it can make legible or a new channel by which it can act, that outlasts the discrepancy and serves a class of later ones | At the owner’s review of 2026-11-03. “Self-formation” had appeared uncoded in CLAIM-022’s note of 2026-11-02, CLAIM-540, CLAIM-533, QUESTION-071’s notes and CLAIM-532, past the second-time rule. This term fixes the sense; CLAIM-532 is the thesis that it is what TERM-023’s transformation dimension produces, and CASE-191 a construction of it. It is the record’s sense, not Kane’s: Kane’s self-forming actions are undetermined choices that form the will, and this term says nothing about determinism. ADR-056’s proposed kinds would class it as a construct. | Proposed |
| TERM-100 | provenance, of a capacity or an organization, and which sense: formation provenance (whose process produced it), maintenance provenance (whose process keeps it), or source provenance (what it was made from, the sense the descent term holds) | At the owner’s review of 2026-11-03 (“there are probably one or more TERMs we could either connect to or add that would help make these groupings persistent”), after CASE-191 found that formation and maintenance provenance come apart, and that only the second can be read off a present organization. “Provenance” was already used in both senses, uncoded: CLAIM-522’s “maintenance provenance”, CASE-161, CASE-179’s arms. TERM-084 holds a third sense, a realization made from a source. This term separates them, says what can test each, and names the entries that turn on formation provenance, so that they can cite it. ADR-056’s proposed kinds would class it as a disambiguation. | Proposed |