Topics — What a work is about. Nucleation holds whatever reading the owner files here, whether or not an Anthology of the SOTA topic could also hold it; instruction for ML practice belongs to the anthology (ADR-048). The words are seeded from the clusters the reading-time triage of 2026-09-25 found, and grow by decision.

Psychometrics — measuring minds — scales, reliability and validity, latent-variable and network models of psychological constructs, and model-based estimation of cognitive parameters (ADR-025).

44 of 2004 LIT documents. Back to the full index.

#TitleSummaryStatus
LIT-367 v2Calculation of signal detection theory measuresStanislaw & Todorov (1999), DOI-10.3758/BF03207704. A practical tutorial that gives closed-form SDT measures computed from the hit rate H and false-alarm rate F. They are d′ = Φ⁻¹(H) − Φ⁻¹(F); β = exp{[Φ⁻¹(F)² − Φ⁻¹(H)²]/2}; c = −[Φ⁻¹(H) + Φ⁻¹(F)]/2; the nonparametric A′ and Grier’s B″ (single-formula versions, eqs. 3 and 9); A_z = Φ(intercept/√(1+slope²)) from the z-ROC, whose slope is σ_noise/σ_signal; and A_d′ = Φ(d′/√2), which equals 2AFC proportion correct under the d′ assumptions. It also gives one-line commands for seven software packages. Its worked rating example (50 signal and 25 noise trials, noise SD larger than signal SD) shows d′ ranging from 0.84 to 1.86 across criteria. The authors conclude that d′ should not be used without rating-task evidence of equal variance.Active — read in full 2026-09-30 (NOTE-314); worth reading as the standard short, citable reference for how the SDT measures are computed and what each assumes. It is a tutorial with no new theory. Several of its software pointers (1999 FTP sites, Quattro Pro, SYSTAT commands) are dated, but the formulae are not.
LIT-496Mapping morality with a compass: Testing the theory of ‘morality-as-cooperation’ with a new questionnaireCurry, Jones Chesters & Van Lissa (2019), DOI-10.1016/j.jrp.2018.10.008. The Morality-as-Cooperation Questionnaire, 21 Relevance and 21 Judgement items for seven domains, tested in UK (n = 1,392) and US (n = 469) online samples against the MFQ (UK n = 1,042). Seven factors fit the Relevance items (CFI .98) but not the Judgement items (CFI .87), and the combined seven-domain model is rejected (CFI .73). The MFQ’s five factors fit worse. MFQ purity items are rated about as morally relevant as its loyalty and authority items, which the authors concede contradicts the theory.Proposed — read in full 2026-10-02 (NOTE-412), from the PsyArXiv manuscript; worth reading as the programme’s psychometric test and as the place its authors concede that purity items are rated morally relevant, which “appear[s] to contradict” the theory. Its seven-factor result is weaker than the abstract says. The items were written by the authors, three per domain, from the theory itself, and selected by fit within each domain. Seven factors then fit the Relevance items but not the Judgement items, and the combined seven-domain model is rejected (CFI .73), so the best model has fourteen correlated factors. No non-cooperative item is in the MAC-Q, so it cannot test whether morality is only about cooperation. It would be settled by an item pool written independently of the theory, with harm, purity and other non-cooperative content in it, factored blind, on data that can be shared.
LIT-500Morality beyond the WEIRD: How the nomological network of morality varies across culturesAtari et al. (2023), DOI-10.1037/pspp0000470. The Moral Foundations Questionnaire-2: 36 items, six per foundation, for Care, Equality, Proportionality, Loyalty, Authority and Purity, built and tested on 25 populations (N ≈ 8,700) in local languages. Equality and Proportionality correlate weakly (mean r = .21). Purity is the foundation most related to cultural distance from the U.S. (r = .43) and to religiosity. The individualizing–binding split appears in only three of 19 national networks. The MFQ-2 explains more variance in 30 criterion scores than the MFQ-1 (mean adjusted R² .37 against .30).Active — read in full 2026-10-02 (NOTE-398), from the APA accepted manuscript; worth reading as the current Moral Foundations measure (the MFQ-2) and the theory’s current list of six foundations, with Fairness split into Equality and Proportionality, and as the place MFT answers morality-as-cooperation directly: Curry et al. 2019 “left out Purity as an important and less-WEIRD moral foundation”. Its strongest evidence for that, Purity’s association with cultural distance from the U.S., rests on the one subscale that fails its own measurement-invariance threshold. Its samples are online panels in 25 populations, not small-scale societies.
LIT-513Validation of Morality as Cooperation Questionnaire in Turkey, and Its Relation to Prosociality, Ideology, and Resource ScarcityYilmaz, Harma & Doğruyol (2021), DOI-10.1027/1015-5759/a000627. In Turkish undergraduates (n = 445), the MAC-Q’s seven-factor model fits the Relevance items (CFI .949, RMSEA .053) but not the Judgement items or the full form, as in the original. Deference and family track resistance to change, and fairness tracks lower opposition to equality. Resource-scarcity primes in Turkey (n = 576) and a preregistered US study (n = 921) change nothing. Relevance scores correlate modestly with prosocial intentions.Active — read in full 2026-10-02 (NOTE-397), from the accepted manuscript; worth reading as the first independent test of the MAC-Q, by a team with no morality-as-cooperation author. It reproduces the questionnaire’s main result in Turkish undergraduates (n = 445): seven factors fit the Relevance items (CFI .949) and fail on the Judgement items (CFI .828) and the full form (CFI .752). Its two resource-scarcity experiments are null. Its scope is narrow: there is no non-cooperative item, so it tests MAC’s structure, not its claim that morality is only cooperation; and the latent correlations (fairness–property .87, family–group .80) and a second-order single factor fitting at CFI .906 limit how distinct the seven are.
LIT-547A Network Theory of Mental DisordersBorsboom (2017), World Psychiatry 16(1):5–13. Mental disorders are not common causes of their symptoms but states of networks of symptoms that cause one another, through “myriads of biological, psychological and societal mechanisms”. Five principles; the dynamic one is hysteresis: a strongly connected network, once activated by an external trigger, can sustain itself after the trigger is gone. Disorder is an alternative stable state of a strongly connected network, mental health the stable state of a weakly connected one. Comorbidity follows from bridge symptoms. Treatments are symptom, external-field or network interventions.Active — read in full 2026-10-03 (NOTE-435); worth reading as the short, citable statement of the network theory of mental disorders by its main author. Five principles: disorders are complex systems of interacting components, the components are the symptoms of the diagnostic manuals, the network comes from direct causal connections between symptoms, disorders are the tightly connected clusters, and disorders arise through hysteresis, so a strongly connected network can stay “stuck” after its trigger is gone. Mental health, disorder, resilience and vulnerability are redefined as stable states and dispositions of weakly or strongly connected networks. Its evidence is indirect and it says so: the theory is offered as an “organizing framework” and a deliberate simplification, and the strict symptom-component correspondence of principle 2 is its own flagged weak point.
LIT-563HDDM: Hierarchical Bayesian Estimation of the Drift-Diffusion Model in PythonWiecki, Sofer & Frank (2013), Frontiers in Neuroinformatics 7:14. HDDM is an open-source Python package that estimates the drift diffusion model (and the linear ballistic accumulator) by hierarchical Bayesian MCMC: subject parameters drawn from group distributions with informative priors, full posteriors, outlier handling, and regression of parameters on trial-by-trial covariates. A tutorial reproduces a theta-power effect on decision threshold that reverses under subthalamic deep brain stimulation. In simulations hierarchical Bayes recovers parameters and detects effects better than χ²-quantile and maximum-likelihood fitting, most with few trials.Active — read in full 2026-10-03 (NOTE-466); worth reading as the methods paper for HDDM, the Python package that fits the drift diffusion model by hierarchical Bayesian estimation (PyMC, MCMC), with subject parameters drawn from group distributions and trial-by-trial regressions of parameters on covariates such as EEG power. Its simulations show hierarchical Bayes recovering parameters with less error than per-subject χ²-quantile, maximum-likelihood or non-hierarchical Bayesian fits, most of all with few trials, and detecting drift-rate differences and covariate effects more often. The comparisons are the authors’ own, on data simulated from the model being fitted, and its hypothesis tests on the group posterior differ from the t-tests used for the other methods.
LIT-574 v2A Multicomponent Conceptualization of Authenticity: Theory and ResearchKernis & Goldman (2006), Advances in Experimental Social Psychology 38:283–357. Unread. As two read papers report it: authenticity is “the unimpeded operation of one’s true self in one’s daily enterprise”, it is measured by the 45-item Authenticity Inventory (AI-3), and dispositional authenticity correlates with self-esteem (r = .47), self-concept clarity and self-actualization and negatively with distress. It is commonly summarized as four components: awareness, unbiased processing, behaviour and relational orientation.Unavailable — registered 2026-10-03 from the Crossref record and from two read papers that report it, not read. No lawful full text was found: the chapter is paywalled at Elsevier (ScienceDirect), Unpaywall and Semantic Scholar list it as closed, and the copies a web search turns up are uploads to ResearchGate and academia.edu, neither an author or institutional deposit that could be reached (ResearchGate refuses automated requests). Michael Kernis died in 2009, so no author page holds it. It is a 75-page chapter; a human reader with library access to Advances in Experimental Social Psychology 38 can read it, and that would move this to Active.
LIT-576The Diffusion Decision Model: Theory and Data for Two-Choice Decision TasksRatcliff & McKoon (2008), Neural Computation 20(4):873–922. A review of the diffusion decision model for fast two-choice tasks, with three new motion-discrimination experiments. Noisy evidence accumulates from a starting point z to one of two boundaries (0, a) at drift v, plus non-decision time and across-trial variability in v, z and Ter. The model fits accuracy and full correct and error RT distributions, and maps difficulty to drift, speed–accuracy instructions to boundary separation and stimulus proportion mainly to starting point. Applications cover aging, aphasia and links to neural firing.Active — read in full 2026-10-03 (NOTE-445), from the author manuscript in PubMed Central; worth reading as the canonical statement of the diffusion decision model and of what it is for. Two-choice RT and accuracy are decomposed into drift rate (quality of evidence), boundary separation (caution), starting point (bias) and non-decision time, plus across-trial variability in drift, starting point and non-decision time. Three new motion-discrimination experiments show each manipulation landing on its own parameter: difficulty on drift, speed–accuracy instructions on boundaries, stimulus proportion mainly on starting point. Its closing claim, that diffusion models have come “as near to provid[ing] a solution to simple decision making as is possible in behavioral science”, is the authors’ assessment, not a result.
LIT-592 v2The Authentic Personality: A Theoretical and Empirical Conceptualization and the Development of the Authenticity ScaleWood, Linley, Maltby, Baliousis & Joseph (2008), Journal of Counseling Psychology 55(3):385–399. Unread. Per its abstract it builds the 12-item Authenticity Scale on a tripartite, person-centred conception (self-alienation, authentic living, accepting external influence), supported by exploratory and multigroup confirmatory factor analysis, with discriminant validity from the Big Five, nonsignificant correlations with social desirability, test–retest r = .78 to .91, and strong relations of every subscale to self-esteem and well-being.Unavailable — registered 2026-10-03 from the abstract on the University of Manchester research portal and the repository records, not read. Every lawful copy found is out of reach: Manchester’s portal lists a pre-peer-review manuscript (PRE-PEER-REVIEW.PDF, 143 KB) whose download is behind a JavaScript and cookie challenge, which I did not try to get past; Stirling’s STORRE holds the published version under a permanent embargo (“The publisher does not allow this work to be made publicly available”); Warwick’s WRAP and Lincoln’s repository records carry no file; ResearchGate refused the request. A human reader can open the Manchester manuscript in a browser, or ask an author for a copy through STORRE; either would move this to Active.
LIT-609Bayesian hypothesis testing for psychologists: A tutorial on the Savage–Dickey methodWagenmakers, Lodewyckx, Kuriyal & Grasman (2010), Cognitive Psychology 60(3):158–189. For nested models, H0: φ = φ0 inside H1, the Bayes factor BF01 equals the ratio of the posterior to the prior density of φ at φ0 under H1 (Eq. 12), if the nuisance parameters’ prior under H1 tends to their prior under H0 as φ → φ0. So a Bayes factor can be read off MCMC samples from the larger model alone, with a nonparametric density estimate at one point. Order restrictions are handled by truncating prior and posterior. Three worked psychology examples, including hierarchical one- and two-sample t-tests. Limitations stated in §8: density estimates in the tails, nested models only, and the Borel–Kolmogorov paradox.Active — read in full 2026-10-03 (NOTE-484); worth reading as the record’s working statement of the Savage–Dickey density ratio: for nested models, the Bayes factor for a point null φ = φ0 is the height of the posterior for φ at φ0 divided by the height of the prior there (Eq. 12), provided the nuisance parameters’ prior under the alternative, as φ → φ0, equals their prior under the null. Its derivation is Appendix A. Read it for the condition and for the limitations of §8 (density estimation in the tails, nested models only, the Borel–Kolmogorov paradox), not for the psychology examples, which are illustrations.
LIT-1186 v2Assessing correspondence between subjective reports and visual targets during attempted out-of-body experiencesWeiler, Abraham, Acunzo & Hermansson (2026), from the abstract and press coverage only. Twenty-one people affiliated with an OBE-training institute tried to perceive a target picture, drawn from a standardized database and unknown to participants and researchers, displayed in a separate, inaccessible room. Ten reported an OBE; thirteen gave descriptions. Each description and the target captions were embedded with a pretrained language model, and the correct target’s cosine similarity was ranked against 100 candidates per trial (primary analysis; z-scores secondary). No trial and no combined rank test exceeded chance. Controls showed the pipeline finds targets when semantic correspondence is present, but, the authors say, not that it is sensitive to naturalistic human language. Two participants spontaneously reported accurate details of the experimenters’ locations and activities in an adjacent room, which were not predefined outcomes.Unavailable — filed 2026-10-16 from the PubMed abstract (42617381); no lawful full text was reached on 2026-10-16, so it is not read and no NOTE is filed. Where the reader looked: Unpaywall and OpenAlex (both “closed”, no repository copy); Europe PMC (“Subscription required”, not in PMC); ScienceDirect (PII S1550830726001941, 403 to this client, and paywalled); the Elsevier text-mining API Crossref lists (rate-limited, and it needs a subscriber key); Crossref posted-content and web searches for a preprint on PsyArXiv, OSF or ResearchGate (none found); OSF’s API and search for a preregistration or data project (OSF returned 503 throughout, so this is unsettled); the University of Virginia Division of Perceptual Studies publications page (no copy listed); Entangled Labs’ site (connection reset); and press coverage (News-Medical, WHSV), which links only to the ScienceDirect abstract and mentions no preprint, preregistration or data. A failure of availability, not merely of access, except for OSF, which should be rechecked. It stays Unavailable until a copy is supplied, not on merit. Registered at the owner’s request (U9 of the exchange of 2026-10-16 on active inference). OSF was retried on 2026-10-17 and was down for scheduled maintenance, so a preregistration there is still unchecked.
LIT-1189 v3Does Measuring Intent Change Behavior?Morwitz, Johnson & Schmittlein (1993). Merely asking purchase intent once raised the later purchase rate; asking repeatedly made those with low intent less likely to buy. Both effects were weaker with prior experience of the product.Unfetched — filed 2026-10-16 from the abstract; on 2026-10-16 a search for a lawful full text reached none, so it is not read and no NOTE is filed. OpenAlex lists it as green open access through an SSRN submitted version (abstract_id 1424067), but SSRN’s abstract page and its Delivery.cfm download both returned 403 “Content Blocked” to this client. Semantic Scholar reports it closed. The web archive could not be reached (connection resets, then 429). Web searches for author-posted or course copies (Morwitz at NYU Stern, Johnson at Columbia, Schmittlein; .edu PDFs; the University of Florida course page that holds Feldman and Lynch and Slovic) found citations and later papers only, not this one. ResearchGate returned 403. The summary and “Why this is here” are still the abstract’s, unchecked. It stays Unfetched until a copy is supplied; the SSRN copy is the likeliest route through a browser. Free copy: ssrn.com/abstract=1424067 (the SSRN submitted version).
LIT-1196 v2Self-generated validity and other effects of measurement on belief, attitude, intention, and behaviorFeldman & Lynch (1988). A theoretical paper, with no data of its own. Belief, attitude or intention can be created by measurement when the construct does not already exist in long-term memory, and the created answer is stored and retrieved as an input to later answers and to behaviour. Even when it exists, question order and format decide which earlier answer is used: an earlier response is used for a later one if it is accessible and perceived as more diagnostic than other accessible inputs. Expertise, direct experience and trait involvement reduce the effects, because they supply judgements already formed and rehearsed.Active — read 2026-10-16 (NOTE-957) in full, from a scan of the published article posted on a University of Florida course page; worth reading as the theoretical statement that a survey question can create the cognition it asks about, which is then stored and retrieved as an input to later answers and to behaviour, with accessibility and perceived diagnosticity deciding which earlier answer is used. Read it knowing that it reports no data of its own and calls itself speculative; that the created state it cares most about is one that drives behaviour; and that the moderators it names (expertise, direct experience, trait involvement) work by supplying judgements already formed and rehearsed, not evidence from outside them.
LIT-1264No specific relationship between hypnotic suggestibility and the rubber hand illusionEhrsson, Fotopoulou, Radziun, Longo & Tsakiris (2022), Nat Commun 13:564, a Matters Arising on Lush et al. (2020). Reanalysing the open data of all 353 participants, they find no relationship between hypnotisability and the synchronous-minus-asynchronous difference in illusion ratings (rho = -0.066, BF01 = 5.7) or in proprioceptive drift (rho = 0.047, BF01 = 1.7), a significant synchrony effect in every hypnotisability quartile, and no effect of explicit suggestions about which condition should work. The correlations Lush et al. report hold as much for the asynchronous condition and for an “impossible” visual hallucination item, so they read hypnotisability as a general influence on report, not a driver of the illusion.Active — read 2026-10-20 (NOTE-997) in full with its supplementary figure; worth reading as the case for the rubber hand illusion surviving trait suggestibility, made from Lush et al.’s own open data (n = 353): the synchronous-minus-asynchronous difference in illusion ratings does not vary with hypnotisability (Bayes factor 5.7 for the null), is significant in every quartile of it including the least suggestible, and is unmoved by explicit instructions about which condition should work. Read it as a reanalysis and an argument, not new data: it treats the asynchronous condition as a valid control, which is exactly what the reply (Lush & Seth 2022) disputes, and its drift analysis is inconclusive by its own Bayes factor.
LIT-1267Reply to: No specific relationship between hypnotic suggestibility and the rubber hand illusionLush & Seth (2022), Nat Commun 13:563, replying to Ehrsson et al. (2022). They accept the reanalyses and dispute the reading: an asynchronous condition is no control for demand characteristics, because expectancies are higher for the synchronous condition, and in their sample the expectancy difference did not vary with hypnotisability (b = -0.16, P = 0.072, B = 0.07). Highly hypnotisable participants may meet those expectancies by generating the experience, less hypnotisable ones by response bias. Agreement with “I felt as if the rubber hand were my hand” rose with hypnotisability (b = 0.76, rs = 0.27) and averaged 0.7 on a seven-point scale whose maximum is 3. Whether multisensory integration plays a significant role in RHI measures awaits experiments with adequate controls.Active — read 2026-10-20 (NOTE-1003) in full; worth reading as the clearest short statement of why a synchronous-minus-asynchronous difference cannot by itself show that the rubber hand illusion is multisensory: participants expect more from the synchronous condition, and in Lush et al.’s sample (n = 353) that expectancy difference did not vary with hypnotisability, so a null relation between hypnotisability and the synchrony effect is what demand characteristics predict too. It adds that agreement with the ownership item rises steeply with hypnotisability (b = 0.76 per SWASH point) and reaches minimal agreement only in the top 31%. Read it as a reply: the expectancy and ownership regressions are post hoc, as the authors grant of both sides, and its alternative for low-suggestible participants, response bias, is asserted and not measured.
LIT-1268No causal link between changes in hand position sense and feeling of limb ownership in the rubber hand illusionAbdulkarim & Ehrsson (2016; online 2015), Attention, Perception, & Psychophysics 78:707–720. During 90 s of synchronous or asynchronous brushing, a motor moved the participant’s hidden hand 8 cm toward or away from the rubber hand at 0.9 mm/s, below the threshold for feeling the movement. Pointing to the hand followed the displacement (drift main effect η² .68 in Experiment 1), but questionnaire ownership depended only on synchrony and did not differ between toward, away or a static hand (n = 18 in each of two experiments). The static condition reproduced the classic synchronous drift and its correlation with the illusion (r = .56). The authors conclude that changing hand position sense does not change ownership, so drift is not a cause of the illusion; whether ownership causes drift is left open.Active — read 2026-10-20 (NOTE-992) in full; worth reading as the direct test of whether a change in felt hand position causes the feeling of owning the rubber hand. A motor slid the hidden real hand 8 cm toward or away from the rubber hand during stroking, too slowly to notice; pointing moved with it by about 5–6 cm, and questionnaire ownership did not change, in two experiments of 18. The authors conclude that drift is not a prerequisite of the illusion and is a process distinct from ownership, while still defending drift as a measure when the hand is immobile. Read it as a null result from 18 participants with no equivalence test, within distances (8–24 cm) where the illusion is known to work, and with some statistics that do not agree with their own test values.
LIT-1271Trait phenomenological control predicts experience of mirror synaesthesia and the rubber hand illusionLush, Botan, Scott, Seth, Ward & Dienes (2020), Nature Communications 11:4853. Trait hypnotisability (the Sussex-Waterloo Scale, SWASH), which the authors call phenomenological control, predicted vicarious pain (n = 404) and mirror touch (n = 154), and, in a rubber hand illusion study of 353, agreement with the ownership and location items after both synchronous and asynchronous brushing, a visual control item, and, weakly, synchronous proprioceptive drift. An attempt to manipulate expectations failed, so the evidence is correlational. The authors conclude that the usual asynchrony and control-item checks do not rule out suggestion, and that the illusion as commonly reported may be at least partly an implicit imaginative-suggestion effect.Active — read in full 2026-10-20 (NOTE-990), with its supplementary information and the peer review file; worth reading as the first large-sample test of whether the rubber hand illusion, as it is usually measured, tracks the trait that hypnosis scales measure. In 353 undergraduates, hypnotisability predicted agreement with the ownership items after synchronous brushing (about half a scale point per SWASH point, rs 0.26), and just as well after asynchronous brushing and for a visual “control” item; it predicted synchronous proprioceptive drift weakly (rs 0.11). In separate samples of 404 and 154 it predicted vicarious pain and mirror touch. The planned manipulation of expectations failed, so nothing here is causal, and the pre-registered test, hypnotisability against the synchronous-minus-asynchronous difference, was inconclusive. Read it as strong evidence that the standard asynchrony and control-item checks do not control for suggestion, and as no evidence on whether the synchrony effect survives such a control. Seth, author of LIT-1263, is a co-author.
LIT-1272Explaining Away the Body: Experiences of Supernaturally Caused Touch and Touch on Non-Hand Objects within the Rubber Hand IllusionHohwy & Paton (2010), PLoS ONE 5:e9416. Through a head-mounted display, a foreign arm (an experimenter’s, then a rubber one) was seen aligned with the participant’s own arm while both were tapped. Synchronous tapping, against asynchronous, raised ratings that the felt touch was produced by the seen finger on the seen arm, and the rating held through pauses of up to a minute (n = 13). After onset, synchrony also raised ratings that a finger hovering 5 cm off the rubber arm caused the touch and that touch was felt on a cardboard box (n = 11 and 10); without prior onset the box gave no synchrony difference (n = 9). The real hand was 0.13 °C cooler under synchrony in one comparison only. The authors read the results as the visual body image being “explained away” by ongoing multisensory inference, and as support for one-deficit theories of delusion.Active — read in full 2026-10-20 (NOTE-998); worth reading as a philosopher’s small rubber hand experiment that pushes the illusion past where it should break, and as the study Apps & Tsakiris cite for cooling of the real hand. Through a head-mounted display the foreign arm was seen exactly where the participant’s own arm lay. Synchronous tapping made people rate the touch as produced on the seen arm (13 people), and after onset they went on to rate touch as caused by a finger hovering 5 cm off a rubber arm, or felt on a cardboard box (10 and 11 people); some described the hovering finger as magnetism, ESP or black magic. Nine people shown the box without prior onset gave no synchrony difference. The real hand was 0.13 °C cooler under synchrony in one of four comparisons, by what reads as a one-tailed test. Read it as four small samples, single leading questions with no ownership item, no expectation measure, and a temperature result too weak to carry the claim that the real hand loses ownership.
LIT-1275What is embodiment? A psychometric approachLongo, Schüür, Kammers, Tsakiris & Haggard (2008), Cognition 107:978–998. 131 participants rated 27 statements after synchronous and asynchronous brushing of a rubber hand. Principal components analysis gave four components in both conditions (embodiment of the rubber hand, loss of own hand, movement, affect) and a fifth, deafference, after asynchrony only. A second analysis split embodiment into ownership, location and agency. Ownership and location were positive after synchronous brushing and negative after asynchronous; agency was negative after both. Drift toward the rubber hand was 1.34 cm after synchrony and a non-significant 0.30 cm after asynchrony, and ownership and location each predicted it.Active — read 2026-10-20 (NOTE-1004) in full, from the published article on the first author’s lab site; worth reading as the first large-sample measurement of what the rubber hand illusion feels like, and as the study that split “embodiment” of a rubber hand into ownership, location and agency. 131 people rated 27 statements after 60 s of synchronous and of asynchronous brushing. A principal components analysis found four components in both conditions (embodiment of the rubber hand, loss of own hand, movement, affect) and a fifth, deafference, only after asynchronous brushing. Ownership and location rose above neutral only after synchrony, agency stayed below it, and ownership and location each predicted proprioceptive drift. Read it knowing that the three subcomponents come from a second varimax rotation of ten items dominated by one component, that there is no control for expectation or suggestion, and that every item is about a hand, none about the whole body.
LIT-1276Demand Characteristics Confound the Rubber Hand IllusionLush (2020), Collabra: Psychology 6(1):22. A pre-registered quasi-experiment on the controls of the rubber hand illusion. Twenty undergraduates (after 12 pre-registered exclusions) who had never taken part in it were shown a text and a video of the procedure and rated how far they expected to feel each of Botvinick & Cohen’s three illusion and six control statements, under synchronous and asynchronous brushing. Expectancy was higher for illusion than control statements under synchrony (M 1.7 against 0.0, t(19) = 6.24, d = 1.40) and for synchronous than asynchronous illusion statements (1.7 against 0.4, t(19) = 4.68, d = 1.05), and nine who had never heard of the illusion showed the same. The controls therefore do not match expectations, and the author concludes the illusion “may be, partially or entirely, a suggestion effect”; he proposes controls matched on expectancy and on suggestion difficulty.Active — read in full 2026-10-20 (NOTE-1005) from the author’s final manuscript on PsyArXiv; worth reading as the direct test of the assumption behind every standard check on the rubber hand illusion, that expectations are matched between the “illusion” and “control” statements and between synchronous and asynchronous brushing. Twenty people who never underwent the illusion read a description of it, watched a 62-second video and rated, for each of Botvinick & Cohen’s nine statements, how far they expected to feel it. They expected the illusion statements more than the control statements under synchrony (1.7 against 0.0, d = 1.40) and the illusion statements more under synchrony than asynchrony (1.7 against 0.4, d = 1.05): the pattern published reports show. Read it as showing that the usual controls cannot rule out suggestion, not as showing that the illusion is suggestion; the author says so. Small, pre-registered, sequential Bayesian stopping, one online sample of undergraduates, and no illusion or drift measured.
LIT-1280Serious Problems With Interpreting Rubber Hand “Illusion” ExperimentsRoseboom & Lush (2022), Collabra: Psychology 8(1):32274. A resampling study of the synchronous-condition reports of 351 participants from Lush et al. 2020, run as 10,000 simulated experiments of 20 participants each. Unselected samples found mean agreement with the three standard statements significantly above zero in 83% of experiments; samples from above the median of hypnotisability (subjective SWASH) in 99%; from below it in 51%. For the ownership statement alone the lower half gave significant agreement in about 4% of experiments, and the upper half in 74% (supplement). The authors argue that the relationship is not too small to matter, that the synchronous–asynchronous difference cannot be interpreted because of Lush (2020), and that implicit, neuroimaging and animal measures are tied to ownership only through these reports.Active — read in full 2026-10-20 (NOTE-1001) from the accepted manuscript on PsyArXiv, with the authors’ analysis notebooks for 10, 20 and 50 participants; worth reading as the clearest demonstration of what a modest correlation between hypnotisability and rubber hand report does to a field of small studies. Resampling the 351 synchronous-condition reports of Lush et al. 2020 in simulated experiments of 20, samples drawn from the upper half of the hypnotisability scale found significant agreement with the three illusion statements 99% of the time and samples from the lower half 51%; for the one ownership statement, “I felt as if the rubber hand were my hand”, the figures were 74% and 4%. Read it as a reanalysis of one dataset, with no new data and no asynchronous or drift analysis. Its headline numbers depend on n = 20: at n = 50 the lower half finds the averaged illusion statements in 95% of experiments, though the ownership statement still only in 6%. The authors themselves leave open that the same people may have the illusion for other reasons.
LIT-1281The Rubber Hand Illusion: Feeling of Ownership and Proprioceptive Drift Do Not Go Hand in HandRohde, Di Luca & Ernst (2011), PLoS ONE 6:e21659. Robot arms stroked a rubber hand and the hidden real hand, and felt finger position was probed by a projected dot. Drift toward the rubber hand built up to about 5–6 cm under synchronous stroking, and to the same level when the hand was only seen, unstroked, or when asynchronous stroking was interrupted every 10 s for measurement. Only 120 s of continuous asynchronous stroking held drift near zero (about 1 cm), which reproduces the classic synchronous–asynchronous difference. The questionnaire showed ownership only after synchronous stroking. The authors conclude that drift and ownership come from different integration processes, that asynchrony suppresses drift rather than synchrony causing it, and that drift is not a valid proxy for ownership. Groups were of ten.Active — read 2026-10-20 (NOTE-1009) in full; worth reading as the study that broke the assumed tie between proprioceptive drift and the feeling of owning the rubber hand. With robot-delivered stroking and a visual probe of felt finger position, drift toward the rubber hand appeared under synchronous stroking, under no stroking at all (only seeing the hand), and under asynchronous stroking interrupted every 10 s, at levels not significantly different from synchronous stroking (about 5–6 cm); only continuous asynchronous stroking kept it near zero. Ownership, by questionnaire, needed synchrony. The authors conclude that drift comes from visuo-proprioceptive integration that asynchrony suppresses, and that “conclusions about feelings of ownership cannot be drawn from measuring proprioceptive drift alone”. Read it as groups of 10, a visual-judgement measure rather than reaching, and an Experiment 2 whose ownership evidence is anecdotal debriefing, not a questionnaire.
LIT-1387 v2Doorways do not always cause forgetting: a multimodal investigationMcFadyen et al. (2021). Four experiments, in immersive virtual reality with and without a working-memory load, in passive video and in real movement, found no significant effect of doorways on forgetting; under working-memory load, false alarms to mismatched probes rose after a doorway. The authors question the effect’s robustness to small changes of paradigm.Active — read in full 2026-10-22 (NOTE-1079) from the publisher’s text in PubMed Central (PMC7938580, CC BY 4.0); worth holding as the record’s only test of the doorway effect outside the originating lab: in passive head-mounted VR doorways did not lower hits (Bayes factors 3–6 for the null), under a counting load they raised false alarms to recombined probes, and a curtained hallway, watched or walked, did not affect memory for a 16-item arrangement. Conceptual rather than direct replications: movement was passive and the hallway task was different. Its one positive finding fits the interference account.
LIT-1436Toward an integrative psychometric model of emotionsLange, Dalege, Borsboom, van Kleef & Fischer (2020), Perspectives on Psychological Science 15(2):444–468. An integrative psychometric model of emotions must allow distinct emotions (affect-program theories), variation between and within persons (constructionist theories) and causal relations among components (appraisal theories). Reflective and formative latent-variable models do not; a psychometric network model, in which “the network constitutes the emotion”, does. Distinct emotions are weakly emergent small-world communities of components. Strongly connected networks sustain their own activation, which predicts hysteresis and longer emotions.Active — read 2026-10-23 (NOTE-1098): in part, from the published version (CC BY-NC) deposited in the University of Amsterdam’s repository. Worth reading as the proposal that an emotion is a network of causally interacting components, the move Borsboom made for mental disorders (LIT-547) applied to emotion. Affect-program, constructionist and appraisal theories each demand one property: distinct emotions, variation between and within persons, and causal relations among components. Reflective and formative latent-variable models fail at least one. A network model meets all three, with a distinct emotion as a weakly emergent small-world community. Strong connectivity predicts self-sustaining activation and hysteresis, so longer emotions. The persistence it gives is a network state’s, not an ordering’s, and the model is unsigned.
LIT-1437The World of Emotions is not Two-DimensionalFontaine, Scherer, Roesch & Ellsworth (2007), Psychological Science 18(12):1050–1057. Against two-dimensional valence–arousal models: in three languages, four dimensions are needed to represent the meaning of emotion words, rated on 144 features covering six emotion components. In order of importance they are evaluation-pleasantness, potency-control, activation-arousal and unpredictability. Unread: known from the abstract and from later papers of the same group.Unavailable — registered 2026-10-23 from Crossref, not read: a lawful copy exists but this client could not reach it. The University of Geneva’s Archive ouverte holds the published version (unige:97776) restricted to UNIGE/HUG users. The University of Reading’s repository (CentAUR, eprint 30302) and Ghent University’s bibliography (418787) list it without a public full text. The SAGE PDF refused this client behind a bot check, and the Geneva E3 Lab’s publications page does not post it. A web search found no author or course posting. OpenAlex points to a CiteSeerX cache, which was not used because its source could not be traced. Its four dimensions are read from the PubMed abstract, and its “potency-control” dimension is glossed as “dominance” by Shuman, Sander and Scherer (LIT-1458). Filed because the record renamed its “dominance” to “potential” to avoid the PAD homonym, and this is the study that places the PAD axis among the component process model’s dimensions. It stays Unavailable until a copy is supplied, not on merit.
LIT-1440Induction and Profiling of Strong Multi-Componential Emotions in Virtual RealityMeuleman & Rudrauf (2021), IEEE Trans. Affective Computing 12:189–202 (online 2018). Passive induction yields weak emotions that do not engage all components, so componential hypotheses cannot be tested with it. In VR, 53 participants played seven games (154 balanced observations) and rated componential items after each. Item clustering gave fear and joy clusters spanning appraisal, motivation, physiology, feeling and regulation. Appraisal predicted fear and joy intensity best. Game differences in fear were absorbed by appraisal and regulation, subject differences in joy were not.Active — read 2026-10-23 (NOTE-1097): in full, from the authors’ accepted manuscript in the Archive ouverte UNIGE (unige:112041). Worth reading as an argument, with data, that passive induction (pictures, film) cannot test componential hypotheses such as synchronization, because it does not engage all components, and that virtual reality can. 53 participants played seven commercial VR games and rated appraisal, motivation, physiology, feeling and regulation items after each. Clustering found multi-componential fear and joy patterns, and appraisal items predicted fear and joy intensity best. Componentiality is assessed across observations, one retrospective self-report per game. Nothing is measured within an episode, and there is no synchronization index.
LIT-1443A Multi-Componential Approach to Emotion Recognition and the Effect of PersonalityMohammadi & Vuilleumier (2022), IEEE Trans. Affective Computing 13:1127–1139 (online 2020). Crowdworkers rated 39 CoreGRID items and 10 discrete emotions after watching film clips (1,567 surveys, 99 clips). Clustering of emotion profiles in componential space separates positive from negative, then five clusters. PCA gives six dimensions beyond valence and arousal. Ordinal regression on all components predicts discrete-emotion ratings best; no single component suffices. Personality correlates more with componential items than with feelings or discrete emotions.Active — read 2026-10-23 (NOTE-1118): in full, from the authors’ arXiv preprint (2010.11370v1, October 2020). Worth reading only as the behavioural groundwork for the later fMRI study (LIT-1444). Crowdworkers rated 39 CoreGRID items and 10 discrete emotions after whole film clips (1,567 surveys, 99 clips). Six principal components emerged (action tendency, pleasant feeling, novelty, norms, arousal, goal relevance). Ordinal regression from all components predicted discrete-emotion ratings better than any single component. Personality traits correlated with componential items more than with feelings. It does not mention synchronization and measures nothing within an episode.
LIT-1444Brain networks subserving functional core processes of emotions identified with componential modelingMohammadi, Van De Ville & Vuilleumier (2023), Cerebral Cortex 33:7993–8010. Twenty participants watched 40 film clips during fMRI and rated 119 salient events (12 s each) on 32 CoreGRID features, and heart and respiration rate were recorded. Partial least squares correlation between event-wise brain maps and feature ratings yields six latent variables, the “functional core processes”: valuation (wanting-like), novelty, hedonic impact (liking-like), goal monitoring, caring for others (“being moved”) and approach/avoidance. No arousal process emerges, and the processes mix components rather than mapping one to one.Active — read 2026-10-23 (NOTE-1107): in full, from the published version (CC BY 4.0) in the Archive ouverte UNIGE (unige:170302). Worth reading as the first attempt to recover the component process model’s components from brain and behaviour together. Twenty participants watched 40 film clips during fMRI and then rated 119 salient 12-second events on 32 CoreGRID features. Heart and respiration rate were recorded. Partial least squares correlation found six brain–behaviour latent variables, read as valuation, novelty, hedonic impact, goal monitoring, caring for others and approach/avoidance. For the record, the result is two distinct valence-like networks: a “wanting”-like valuation process and a “liking”-like hedonic one. Each event gets a feature vector, but no within-episode synchronization is computed.
LIT-1448Back to Bentham? Explorations of Experienced UtilityKahneman, Wakker & Sarin (1997), Quarterly Journal of Economics 112(2):375–405. “Utility” has two meanings: decision utility, an outcome’s weight in choice, and experienced utility, its hedonic quality. Experienced utility is instant (the pleasure or distress of the moment, reported in real time) or remembered (a retrospective evaluation). Remembered utility follows the Peak-End average and neglects duration. Choices follow remembered utility, so subjects repeat a longer cold-water trial that dominates the shorter one in pain. Axioms on ordinal instant utility with a neutral zero make total utility the time integral of a value transform.Active — read 2026-10-23 (NOTE-1105): in full, from the published article as deposited in Erasmus University Rotterdam’s repository (RePub, hdl 1765/23011). Distinguishes decision utility (an outcome’s weight in choice) from experienced utility (hedonic quality). Experienced utility divides into instant utility, reported in real time, and remembered utility, a retrospective evaluation. Remembered utility follows a Peak-End rule and neglects duration. Choices follow remembered utility, so people choose dominated, longer painful episodes. Axioms on ordinal instant utility with a neutral zero yield total utility as a time integral. Filed for the record’s three-layer operationalization of felt valence (CLAIM-440).
LIT-1453 v2Relationship between attitudes and evaluative space: A critical review, with emphasis on the separability of positive and negative substratesCacioppo & Berntson (1994), Psychological Bulletin 115(3):401–423. The review that introduced the evaluative space model. Attitudes have been measured on one bipolar scale. The positive and negative evaluative processes behind them are separable, and can be activated reciprocally, independently or together. Unread: the model is read in Norris et al. 2010 (LIT-1438).Unfetched — registered 2026-10-23 from Crossref, not read: a lawful copy exists, but this client could not fetch it, so it failed on access, not availability. Looked for on 2026-10-23. Cacioppo posted the paper on his University of Chicago reprint page (psychology.uchicago.edu/people/faculty/cacioppo/jtcreprints/cb94.pdf). That URL now returns 404, and the Internet Archive’s capture of 2012-05-16 (timestamp 20120516001838) could not be fetched: web.archive.org reset the connection, and the fetch tool refuses the domain. Unpaywall reports no open copy. The journal (APA, Psychological Bulletin) is closed. A ResearchGate copy was seen and not used. The model is read first-hand in its authors’ 2010 review in PubMed Central (LIT-1438), whose Figures 2 and 3 are adapted from this paper. It stays Unfetched until a copy is supplied, not on merit.
LIT-1456 v2Beyond Bipolar Conceptualizations and Measures: The Case of Attitudes and Evaluative SpaceCacioppo, Gardner & Berntson (1997), PSPR 1(1):3–25. The full statement of the evaluative space model for attitudes. Bipolar measures fold together states that a bivariate measure keeps apart, among them ambivalence (high positivity and negativity) and indifference (low both). Unread: the model is read in Norris et al. 2010 (LIT-1438).Unfetched — registered 2026-10-23 from Crossref, not read: a lawful copy exists, but this client could not fetch it, so it failed on access, not availability. Looked for on 2026-10-23. Cacioppo posted the paper on his University of Chicago reprint page (psychology.uchicago.edu/people/faculty/cacioppo/jtcreprints/cgb97.pdf). That URL now returns 404, and the Internet Archive’s capture of 2012-05-16 (timestamp 20120516012547) could not be fetched: web.archive.org reset the connection, and the fetch tool refuses the domain. Unpaywall reports no open copy. The journal (Personality and Social Psychology Review, SAGE) is closed. A web search found only bibliographic records and secondary accounts. The model is read first-hand in its authors’ 2010 review in PubMed Central (LIT-1438), which names this paper and its 1999 sequel as the statement of the evaluative space model. It stays Unfetched until a copy is supplied, not on merit.
LIT-1460Semiorders and a Theory of Utility DiscriminationLuce (1956), Econometrica 24(2):178–191. The paper that introduced semiorders: preference relations whose indifference need not be transitive, because differences below a threshold of discrimination go unnoticed. By its abstract, the class it axiomatizes is “substantially equivalent” to a utility theory with just-noticeable-difference functions. Unread: no lawful copy reached.Unavailable — registered 2026-10-23 from Crossref, not read: no lawful full text could be reached. OpenAlex and Semantic Scholar list no open copy; JSTOR and the Econometric Society give the abstract only (the issue is not in JSTOR’s free early-journal content, which stops well before 1956); a web search found no author, course or repository posting. Filed because it is the paper that introduced the semiorder, the structure the record’s correction to CLAIM-436 turns on: a relation with a discrimination threshold whose indifference is not transitive. It stays Unavailable until a copy is supplied, not on merit.
LIT-1463Interaction and threshold effects of appraisal on componential patterns of emotion: A study using cross-cultural semantic dataMeuleman, Moors, Fontaine, Renaud & Scherer (2019), Emotion 19:425–442. Re-analyses the GRID cross-cultural data on the meaning of 24 emotion words (34 samples, 27 countries) to test whether appraisal acts on motivation, physiology and expression through interactions and nonlinear effects. PCA reduces items to 7 appraisal and 11 response factors. Multivariate adaptive regression splines (MARS) select third-order interactions and hinges. Goal compatibility is the main effect, agency and norm compatibility pure modifiers. The strong hierarchy of appraisal decision trees is not found. Simulated patterns matched to words form a coherent map.Active — read 2026-10-23 (NOTE-1104): in full, from the authors’ accepted manuscript in Ghent University’s repository (biblio.ugent.be 8560097). Worth reading as the one study here that tests whether appraisal acts on the other emotion components linearly. It re-analyses the GRID data, culturally shared semantic profiles of 24 emotion words rated in 34 samples from 27 countries. It fits multivariate adaptive regression splines from seven appraisal factors to eleven motivation, physiology and expression factors. Goal compatibility is the main effect. Agency and norm compatibility act only in interactions, and some responses need splines. Its “threshold effects” are hinges in a continuous piecewise-linear fit. The data are word meanings, not episodes, and have no time, so they cannot bear on continuity or hysteresis in choice.
LIT-1469Feelings change: Accounting for individual differences in the temporal dynamics of affectKuppens, Oravecz & Tuerlinckx (2010), Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 99(6):1042–1060. DynAffect: individual differences in how feelings change over time come from three processes, an affective home base (“a baseline attractor state around which affect fluctuates”), variability in response to internal or external perturbation, and the attractor strength that ties affect back to the home base. Tested with a diffusion model in two experience-sampling studies of core affect, and related to personality and emotion dispositions. Unread beyond the abstract.Unavailable — registered 2026-10-23 from Crossref and the PubMed abstract, not read: a lawful copy exists but this client could not fetch it. OpenAlex lists the article as closed (APA). A copy is posted on co-author Zita Oravecz’s University of California, Irvine site, apparently among course readings, but its certificate chain ends in a root this client does not trust, so the TLS connection failed. The fetch tool returned 503 for the same address. Failed on access, not availability. Filed for the record’s question of how to measure whether an ordering prevails and returns after interruption (QUESTION-268). DynAffect’s attractor strength, the pull that ties affect back to a home base after it is perturbed, is the nearest established operational measure of Frijda’s resumption mark, though it measures the return of an affective state, not of a ranking’s authority. It stays Unavailable until a copy is supplied, not on merit.
LIT-1472 v3Intransitivity of preferencesTversky (1969), Psychological Review 76(1):31–48. Shows experimentally that people’s choices can cycle predictably when options vary on two dimensions and differences on the more important one are small. The model is the lexicographic semiorder: the first dimension decides only when its difference exceeds a threshold, and otherwise the next one does. Unread: a lawful course copy exists but could not be fetched.Unfetched — registered 2026-10-23 from Crossref, not read: a lawful copy exists but this client could not fetch it (“failed on access, not availability”, in ADR-041’s words). The paper is posted for teaching on a UC San Diego faculty page (pages.ucsd.edu/~mckenzie/Tversky1969PsychReview.pdf). This client refused the TLS connection, the server’s certificate chaining to a root not in its trust store; the web fetcher got a 503; the Internet Archive holds no snapshot. OpenAlex and Semantic Scholar list it as closed, APA’s copy is paywalled, a Central European University course copy sits behind a bot check, and a whole-book PDF of Tversky’s selected writings on another UCSD page was not used, its lawfulness being unclear. Filed because its lexicographic semiorder is the structure the correction to CLAIM-436 names. It stays Unfetched until a copy is supplied, not on merit.
LIT-1502 v2A Bayesian Truth Serum for Subjective DataPrelec (2004). A scoring method for subjective reports where objective truth is unknowable: each respondent gives an answer and a prediction of how others will answer, and answers score high not for being common but for being more common than the same population collectively predicted. By the abstract, this removes the bias toward consensus, so that a truthful answer maximizes expected score even for a respondent who believes hers is a minority view.Unavailable — filed 2026-10-24 for the owner’s question of how the record stands on multi-agent learning, as the second founding scoring rule for subjective reports without ground truth; a reading was attempted the same day and failed on availability. The article is closed: Unpaywall, OpenAlex and Semantic Scholar list no open copy, Europe PMC holds the abstract only (not open access, no PMC copy), science.org returned 403 for the PDF, and no author or repository copy was found at MIT (DSpace search for the title and author returns later BTS papers and a thesis, not this one; Prelec’s MIT Sloan page links none). A copy on a third party’s personal site was found by web search and not used, as it is not a lawful public copy. It stays Unavailable until a copy is supplied. No NOTE is filed.
LIT-1693Psychometric validation of the Loyola Generativity Scale in Chilean teachers: evidence for a three factor structureA validation of McAdams and de St. Aubin’s 20-item Loyola Generativity Scale (LGS) in Spanish, with 430 Chilean elementary teachers. Four items were dropped for low sampling adequacy, and a three-factor solution on 14 items was retained (RMSEA = 0.043, CFI = 0.989): Generative Inefficacy (three reverse-scored items), Generative Action (eight items on teaching, creativity and community work) and Generative Legacy (three items on symbolic continuity and contribution to future generations). Action and Legacy correlated .45; Inefficacy correlated −.34 and −.30 with them. Factor-score reliabilities were .80 to .86. The authors read the three factors as an extension of the original two (positive generativity and generative doubts) produced by the teaching context.Active — read in full 2026-10-29 (NOTE-1260), in place of LIT-1777, which could not be reached; worth reading as evidence that legacy motivation can be measured apart from generative action within McAdams’ scale, with the caution that the analysis is exploratory and two items vanish unexplained.
LIT-1812 v2A Collection of Pragmatic-Similarity Judgments over Spoken Dialog UtterancesWard & Marco (2024). The first collection of human pragmatic-similarity ratings: 693 pairs of a spoken dialog utterance and a re-enactment of it, made under six conditions so that similarity varies, rated on a 1–5 slider for “overall feeling, tone, and intent” by 6–9 judges in three sessions, two English and one Spanish, 5,532 ratings in all. Mean pairwise Pearson agreement between judges was 0.45, 0.72 and 0.66 by session, rising with experience and falling for lexically different pairs (0.80 in Session 2 without them). Judges discussed ratings during the sessions, and all pairs are within one language.Active — read in full 2026-10-29 (NOTE-1338) from the LREC-COLING 2024 PDF; worth reading as the first collection of human pragmatic-similarity ratings and for its account of what lowers agreement. The 0.45 the record cites is one session’s single-judge figure; the others are 0.72 and 0.66.
LIT-1853Investigating the “Flow” Experience: Key Conceptual and Operational IssuesAbuhamdeh (2020), Frontiers in Psychology 11:158. Across 42 recent studies flow was operationalized in 24 ways: mostly as a continuous score, 17 times without enjoyment, and often mixed with its proposed conditions. He argues flow should be measured as Csikszentmihalyi defined it, a discrete, highly enjoyable optimal state distinct from its conditions, and that lesser absorption is task involvement, which is not inherently enjoyable. He rejects the view that flow is emotionless.Active — read in full 2026-10-30 (NOTE-1429), from the open-access published article (CC BY) in PubMed Central, PMC7033418, fetched as XML through the Europe PMC REST API. A conceptual review: 42 studies from 2014–2019 operationalized flow in 24 ways, 17 of them without enjoyment. Abuhamdeh argues that flow, as Csikszentmihalyi defined it, is a discrete and highly enjoyable state, distinct from its conditions, and that ordinary absorption is task involvement, “not inherently enjoyable”. It reports the dispute the record needs: Seligman’s “absence of emotion” in flow, and Csikszentmihalyi’s own remark that flow experiences may not be “particularly pleasurable at the time”. It answers them by definition and by appraisal theory, not with data on how flow feels during the episode.
LIT-1954 v2Psychological Need Thwarting in the Sport Context: Assessing the Darker Side of Athletic ExperienceBartholomew et al. (2011), doi:10.1123/jsep.33.1.75. Registered unread from the exchange “Assess SDT Coverage” of 2026-11-02 (A3). The operational construct of need thwarting, which bears on QUESTION-131’s distinction between structural frustration and operative thwarting.Unfetched — searched 2026-11-03 for a lawful full text; one exists but this client could not fetch it, so it is not read and no NOTE is filed. The University of Birmingham repository holds the accepted manuscript at eprints.bham.ac.uk/602/1/Ntoumanis_2011_Journal_of_Sport_and_Exercise_Psychology.pdf (503, upstream timeout) and research.birmingham.ac.uk/files/2921594/Ntoumanis_2011_Journal_of_Sport_and_Exercise_Psychology.pdf, also at birmingham.elsevierpure.com (Cloudflare 403 challenge); core.ac.uk’s copy returned 403, and NTU’s repository a Cloudflare challenge. UEA’s and Curtin’s records hold no file. A browser fetch of the Birmingham address is the cheapest way to read it. Bartholomew’s 2011 Birmingham thesis (etheses.bham.ac.uk/1677) covers the same scale but is not this article and was not read.
LIT-1955 v2The general causality orientations scale: Self-determination in personalityDeci and Ryan (1985), Journal of Research in Personality 19. The General Causality Orientations Scale: twelve vignettes, each with an autonomy, a control and an impersonal response rated 1–7. In 636 students the subscales have α .69–.74 and are nearly independent (autonomy–control r = .03, autonomy–impersonal −.25, control–impersonal .27); two-month retest .71–.78 (n = 51). Autonomy tracks supporting children’s autonomy, ego development and self-esteem; impersonal tracks external locus of control, social anxiety, depression and low self-esteem; control tracks Type-A and public self-consciousness, in samples of 42 to 87. Behavioural results are weak (p < .07 and p = .06 for two of three).Active — read in full 2026-11-03 (NOTE-1531), from the scan on the SDT site. Worth reading as the founding instrument of causality orientations theory: three separately scored, nearly independent orientations with good reliability, whose validity in 1985 was a set of small-sample correlations, behaviour the weakest.
LIT-1978 v2The Basic Psychological Need Satisfaction and Frustration Scales probably do not validly measure need frustration.Murphy, Watts, Baker, Don, Jolink and Algoe (2023), Psychological Assessment 35(2). The BPNSFS’s twelve “frustration” items carry almost no active-thwarting content, the defining part of need frustration since Vansteenkiste and Ryan (2013), and are the negatively keyed half of what Chen (2013) built as a satisfaction measure. In eight pooled samples (N = 3,692), factors sharing a keying direction correlate .64–.75 and satisfaction and frustration of the same need .17–.38; a higher-order model grouping the scales by keying fits better (RMSEA .052, CFI .950) than one grouping them by need (.064, .924; need correlations .94–1.11); and the frustration items’ excess correlation with ill-being follows the keying of the ill-being items. The authors conclude the split is “likely primarily” a keying artefact, while saying the confound cannot be resolved with existing data.Active — read in full 2026-11-03 (NOTE-1530), from the PMC author manuscript; worth reading as the case that the dominant need-frustration measure separates frustration from satisfaction mostly by item keying, which undercuts the BPNSFS evidence THEORY-052 leans on. Shown: the items lack thwarting content and keying organizes the covariance more than need does (THEORY-1316). Argued, not settled: that the frustration scales are therefore keyed low satisfaction (THEORY-1311).
LIT-1988 v2Assessing basic/fundamental psychological need fulfillment: systematic mapping and review of existing scales to foster cumulative scienceKermavnar, Avsec, Huang and Desmet (2024), Frontiers in Psychology 15. A PRISMA review, searched 21 August 2023, of original self-report scales of need fulfillment in healthy general populations: 31 scales from 32 primary studies, 23 based on self-determination theory, with 89 adaptations. 21 measure satisfaction only; four satisfaction and frustration, three support, one frustration only (2020), one thwarting (Bartholomew et al. 2011), one support and thwarting. Autonomy appears in 27 scales, relatedness 24, competence 23, over 30 other needs in a few each. The review documents the four states’ terms used interchangeably, double-barrelled frustration-thwarting items, satisfaction items that ask about thwarting, and the BPNSFS’s frustration scales “repurposed” from negatively coded satisfaction items (after Murphy et al. 2023). It finds no consensus on what makes a need basic, takes no side on the two-dimensional model, and names the IBQ and GNSF as good practice.Active — read in full 2026-11-03 (NOTE-1509), from the version of record (CC BY) via Europe PMC; worth reading as a finding aid to the 31 original need-fulfillment scales and as a plain list of the field’s measurement faults: satisfaction, frustration, support and thwarting confused, frustration scales built from negatively worded satisfaction items, double-barrelled items. It offers no criterion for need-hood (THEORY-1318).
LIT-1996 v2Testing a continuum structure of self-determined motivation: A meta-analysis.Howard et al. (2017), doi:10.1037/bul0000125. Registered unread from the exchange “Assess SDT Coverage” of 2026-11-02 (A2). Bears on THEORY-054, whose promote_when asks for a measure of integrated regulation separable from identified regulation. A2 says the meta-analysis does not find integrated regulation as a distinct factor; that is unverified until read.Unfetched — looked for 2026-11-03, not reached. A lawful free copy exists: the authors’ submitted version in Curtin University’s espace repository, https://espace.curtin.edu.au/bitstream/20.500.11937/69700/2/268067.pdf (OpenAlex’s green open-access location). From this client the address redirects to curate.curtin.edu.au and returns an AWS WAF challenge (HTTP 202, x-amzn-waf-action: challenge), so it was not fetched. The UWA research repository record lists no file; no copy was found on the SDT site. Its main finding is known here only as Ryan et al. 2022 (LIT-1967) report it.