Topics — What a work is about. Nucleation holds whatever reading the owner files here, whether or not an Anthology of the SOTA topic could also hold it; instruction for ML practice belongs to the anthology (ADR-048). The words are seeded from the clusters the reading-time triage of 2026-09-25 found, and grow by decision.
Psychopathology and treatment — what a mental disorder is and how psychological treatment changes it — medical models of illness (biomedical, biopsychosocial, network), the philosophy of psychiatry, functional and transdiagnostic accounts of psychopathology such as experiential avoidance and psychological flexibility, and psychotherapies and their mechanisms of change (ADR-021).
36 of 1352 THEORY documents. Back to the full index.
| # | Title | Summary | Status |
|---|---|---|---|
| THEORY-044 v2 | In relational frame theory the self is verbal behaviour’s content, its process and its context, and the self as context is a perspective learned from deictic relations that cannot itself be found as content | Barnes-Holmes et al. (LIT-541) define three selves: the conceptualized self, the content of verbal relations about oneself; the knowing self, their ongoing process; and the transcendent self, their context. Hayes et al. (LIT-555) say the third arises from deictic frames (I–you, here–there, now–then) as “a sense of self as a locus or perspective”, and is “a context for verbal knowing, not the content”, so its limits “cannot be consciously known”. The account maps the three onto the record’s holdings: the content is the narrative self (Dennett, Gallagher, Strawson), and the context is what Hume could not find among his perceptions and what Metzinger calls a transparent perspective. It differs from the minimal self (Gallagher) on origin: RFT says the perspective is learned in language. The evidence for the learned origin is cited, not read, so Proposed. The clinical claim is THEORY-051. | Proposed |
| THEORY-048 | In explaining psychiatric disorder, biological findings implement psychological functions rather than replacing them | Kendler (2008), LIT-539: following Marr, a lower-level theory either replaces a higher-level construct (temperature by mean kinetic energy) or implements it, and in psychiatry biology “will implement but not replace psychology”. The thesis is argued from neuroscience’s successes in perception, learning and memory, not from a psychiatric case, so it is Proposed. It is a thesis about explanation, not about distinct mental causes: it survives Pernu’s argument (LIT-147) that the neural evidence supports only mental causation by identity. Kendler 2005 (LIT-552), which argued the mind–brain propositions this paper develops, is unread. | Proposed |
| THEORY-050 | Psychological inflexibility, in which verbal relations give private events aversive functions and make experiential avoidance a general strategy, is a transdiagnostic process in psychopathology | Hayes et al. (LIT-555) model psychopathology as inflexibility: cognitive fusion supports experiential avoidance, which narrows behaviour. Barnes-Holmes et al. (LIT-541) give the mechanism: once a word stands in derived relation to an event it can carry that event’s aversive functions, so private events become worth avoiding. Kashdan and Rottenberg (LIT-553) find inflexibility across depression and anxiety in cognitive, behavioural and physiological systems, and say its causal role is unknown. The evidence is correlational, small, mostly self-report and mostly from the model’s authors, and the meta-analysis that would test it (LIT-543) is unread, so Proposed. It is compatible with the loop account of disorder, not a rival to it. | Proposed |
| THEORY-051 v4 | Strengthening the self as context, a perspective from which thoughts about oneself are held as thoughts, is a process by which acceptance and commitment therapy reduces suffering | ACT names the self as context as one of its six processes: from it “one can be aware of ones own flow of experiences without attachment to them”, so it fosters defusion and acceptance, and mindfulness exercises and metaphors foster it (Hayes et al., LIT-555). RFT reads defusion as moving thoughts from I HERE NOW to I THERE THEN, a deictic shift (Barnes-Holmes et al., LIT-541), labelled “no more than a heuristic”. No study in the record tests the self as context as a process. Its only support is borrowed from small defusion studies under RFT’s reading, so Proposed on weak grounds. The conceptual account of the self is THEORY-044. | Proposed |
| THEORY-052 | Frustration of the needs for autonomy, competence and relatedness is a transdiagnostic process in psychopathology | Vansteenkiste, Ryan and Soenens (2020, LIT-561) propose that need frustration, distinct from mere lack of satisfaction, plays “a transdiagnostic role”, citing a longitudinal study in which it predicted adolescents’ depressive and eating symptoms and “largely accounted for their co-occurrence”. Deci and Ryan (LIT-558) had located the etiology of “various forms of psychopathology” in developmental need deprivation, with need substitutes, controlled styles and rigid patterns as the route. The evidence is correlational, mostly self-report, and from the theory’s authors. A partner of the inflexibility account, not a rival. | Proposed |
| THEORY-053 | A treatment’s efficacy is not evidence for its theory of change: only change in the theorised process that is specific and comes before the outcome bears on it, and moving the process without moving the outcome counts against the theory | Salkovskis, Sighvatsson and Sigurdsson (LIT-538): “The effectiveness of a treatment is not evidence for the validity of the theory on which it is based”, with one exception, that changing the theory’s crucial factor without changing the problem disconfirms it. Hofmann and Hayes (LIT-544), from the other wing of CBT: a model whose process cannot be shown to apply “is incorrect and needs to be set aside” even if the intervention works, and a procedure that fails to move the process leaves the model untested. Active because it is close to a logical point and both state it. What it does not say is that mediation proves a mechanism; both sources deny that. | Active |
| THEORY-058 v2 | Mental disorders are maintained by self-reinforcing causal loops rather than expressing a latent common cause, which is how they can outlast their triggers | Three traditions that do not cite one another for it put self-sustaining loops where a latent cause would be. Borsboom (LIT-547) makes disorder an alternative stable state of a strongly connected symptom network, kept up by hysteresis after its trigger has gone. Salkovskis, Sighvatsson and Sigurdsson (LIT-538) make it a threat meaning protected by the behaviour it drives. Kendler (LIT-539) finds causal loops across levels, from genes to culture. The convergence is real; the evidence is indirect, simulated or clinical, and none of it is an individual time series showing hysteresis, so the account is Proposed. It says nothing about what starts a disorder. | Proposed |
| THEORY-285 v2 | In an illustrative active-inference simulation of post-traumatic context inference, run once per phenotype, a prior that one is in a harmful context, made overly precise by a run of harmful trials under the “vulnerable” learning and forgetting weights, makes exploratory sampling look uninformative, so the agent attenuates the periphery, never receives the evidence that would correct the prior, and the belief sustains itself; lowering precision makes the attenuation policy less vigorous without correcting the prior, and the policy returns when precision is restored | Linson, Anderson, Markham, Friston & Moutoussis (2025), LIT-983, read in version 2 in NOTE-766. A mechanism shown in illustrative simulation: policy selection by expected information gain, plus a confident prior, withholds the only disambiguating observations, so the prior keeps itself up. Exposure that restores sampling rebalances it; a precision-lowering drug only suppresses symptoms. No data are fitted, parameters are unreported, and the two intervention arms differ in environment as well as mechanism. | Active |
| THEORY-409 | A person’s mind is normally a system of parts that take protective roles, managers, exiles and firefighters, forced on them by experience and not part of their nature; beneath the parts is a Self, distinct from all of them and present from the start, which appears with calm, curiosity and compassion when the parts step back and which heals by leading the system | Schwartz, LIT-579 (the IFS Institute’s “Evolution” essay, read in NOTE-453) and LIT-591 (Internal Family Systems Therapy, chapter 1 only, NOTE-457, Skimmed). The model in its developer’s words. Its evidence is clinical: clients’ reports of parts, the founding “step back” case, and “hundreds of clients for more than two decades”. No study is reported in either source, and the book’s research chapter was not read. It is filed as the account IFS offers, not as an account the record has tested. | Proposed |
| THEORY-560 | In rodents, gut microbes can drive stress and affect-related behaviour through vagal, immune, endocrine and metabolite routes, and faecal transplant from depressed people partly transfers the phenotype; in people, probiotics have so far shown at most small reductions in subjective stress in healthy volunteers, and strains with strong preclinical records have failed in controlled trials | Forssten et al. (2022), LIT-915, read in NOTE-703. A narrative review with no search method, by employees of a probiotics manufacturer, which documents its own translational failures: L. rhamnosus JB-1 had no effect on any outcome against placebo after “comprehensive preclinical evidence”. The rodent half is well documented; the human half rests on one meta-analysis of healthy volunteers and trials with nulls. Proposed because the source is a narrative industry review; the gap it describes runs against its authors’ interest. | Proposed |
| THEORY-680 | Emotion regulation is a set of processes distinct from emotion generation, by which people influence which emotions they have, when, and how they are experienced and expressed; regulatory acts can be sorted by the point in the generative sequence where they act, and acting before response tendencies form (reappraisal) has different consequences from acting after (suppression) | Gross (1998), LIT-554, read in NOTE-429, the founding review. It reports no data. The five families (situation selection, situation modification, attentional deployment, cognitive change, response modulation) are “working distinctions”. The antecedent and response contrast rests on a handful of film studies it cites: reappraisal lowered negative experience, suppression did not reliably do so and raised sympathetic activation. The paper’s own first open problem is whether regulation can be told apart from generation at all. | Proposed |
| THEORY-892 v2 | Psychopathy as the PCL-R measures it is one dimensional construct rather than a type: its items form four correlated factors, interpersonal, affective, lifestyle and antisocial, explained by one superordinate factor, and its affective features are tied psychometrically, genetically and longitudinally to its antisocial ones, so that no one component is its essence | Hare and Neumann (2008), read in NOTE-1094. The PCL-R’s twenty items load on four correlated factors, which pair into Factor 1 (interpersonal, affective) and Factor 2 (lifestyle, antisocial) and are explained by one superordinate factor. The affective features are tied to the antisocial ones, so the authors deny that any component is the disorder’s core, and they read the evidence as dimensional. Filed for the record’s question on corporate psychopathy, which asks which of these features could be said of a corporation. | Proposed |
| THEORY-895 v2 | Incentive sensitization: repeated drug exposure can make the mesolimbic ‘wanting’ system lastingly hyper-reactive to drug cues and contexts, so that cue-triggered incentive salience grows, persists for years and even increases during abstinence, while ‘liking’ need not rise and may fall; sensitized ‘wanting’ can oppose the person’s cognitive desire, and incentive salience can run without any reportable change in feeling | Berridge and Robinson (2016), LIT-1461, read in NOTE-1109 from the PMC author manuscript. A review by the theory’s authors. Strong in rats and moderate in people for drugs; weak for behavioural addictions, where the authors call the evidence emerging and the mechanism unknown. Filed separately from THEORY-893, which holds the liking–wanting dissociation, because what QUESTION-267 and CLAIM-433 need is the sensitization result: a ranking whose strength is re-keyed to cues, cut loose from both pleasure and the person’s goals, and lasting. | Proposed |
| THEORY-897 v2 | In Brown, Price and Dombrovski’s reading of seven computational learning studies they selected without a systematic search, with mixed directions, anxiety goes with altered adjustment of learning rate to uncertainty, mostly for aversive outcomes, while overall learning rate, choice consistency and outcome valuation show little relation to it | Brown, Price & Dombrovski (2023; preprint 2022), LIT-1479, read in full from the NIH author manuscript in NOTE-1120. Their Table 2 and the synthesis drawn from it: under volatility anxious people adjust learning too little except after very surprising outcomes, and under noise they learn too fast, an effect the authors call less consistent. A narrative review of seven studies, not a meta-analysis; the reading that anxiety cannot tell noise from change is the authors’. | Active |
| THEORY-901 v2 | As Mancinelli and Bach’s systematic review of avoidance learning in healthy humans reports it, rating both A, an avoidance response left available during extinction persists, in some participants for hundreds of unpunished trials, and keeps expectancy of the aversive outcome higher than in people denied it (nine studies); and less effective or costlier responses extinguish faster (six studies, one exception) | Mancinelli & Bach (preprint 2025; NBR 2026), LIT-1477, read in full from the PsyArXiv preprint in NOTE-1134. Rated A (“protection from extinction”, 9 studies; “less efficient or more effortful AR imply less protection from extinction”, 6 studies) in a systematic review of 116 studies. Healthy volunteers, shock or noise. The authors’ explanation, that effective avoidance leaves fewer chances to detect a change, is marked “putatively”. | Active |
| THEORY-903 v2 | In a 2026 meta-analysis of standalone safety-behaviour manipulations outside exposure, mostly with young non-clinical or subclinical adults and mostly on appearance concerns and social anxiety, reducing safety behaviours lowered symptoms relative to control (d = 0.43, about 0.31 after adjustment for publication bias), and instructed increases raised them (d = 0.65, five studies) | Goodson, Patel, Zech, Sala & Cougle (2026), LIT-1491, read in full from the PMC author manuscript in NOTE-1128. 26 studies reviewed, 16 in the reduction and 5 in the increase meta-analyses. The size of the safety-behaviour change moderated the symptom effect (B = 0.23). Egger’s test was significant for the reduction effect on symptoms, and the increase studies could not be tested for bias. It says nothing about the mechanism by which safety behaviours act, and diagnosed anxiety disorders are thinly represented. | Active |
| THEORY-907 v2 | As Chou, Wilson and Smith review them, in about six foraging studies, mostly sub-clinical, higher stress or anxiety went with less exploration, and in one task with a predator to check for (Trier et al. 2023), people higher in trait somatic anxiety checked less and did worse, a reduction the study’s further analyses associated with greater aversion to detecting the predator | Chou, Wilson & Smith (preprint June 2024; NBR 2024), LIT-1483, read in full in NOTE-1127. Foraging: Lenow et al. 2017, Bustamante et al. 2023, Lloyd et al. 2022a and 2022b, with human open-field and plus-maze studies agreeing. Checking: Trier et al. 2023, a single study. Mostly sub-clinical; stress and anxiety are treated together; the mechanisms are the authors’ readings. | Active |
| THEORY-910 v2 | Brown, Price and Dombrovski propose, without a model run or data, that in aversive environments avoiding uncertain states keeps their uncertainty high and so perpetuates avoidance, that anxiety strengthens this loop by misreading noise as change, and that exposure works by reducing the uncertainty rather than an excess of learned threat | Brown, Price & Dombrovski (2023; preprint 2022), LIT-1479, read in full in NOTE-1120. A framework stated in words and schematic figures: the loop is avoidance, unreduced uncertainty, more avoidance. It runs through an uncertainty estimate, a belief, with no authority or control variable. For fear-based disorders; by the authors’ statement it does not explain exposure in GAD. | Active |
| THEORY-912 v2 | In a picture-based avoidance task, treatment-seeking patients with OCD or PTSD avoided a safety cue more than healthy controls and, after effective avoidance, still expected the aversive picture more; patients with panic disorder with agoraphobia or PTSD reported more relief when it was omitted; the groups did not differ in avoiding the danger cues | De Kleine et al. (2023), LIT-1490, read in full from the CC BY version of record in NOTE-1123. 47 controls against 33 OCD, 40 PDA and 66 PTSD patients, cross-sectional, before exposure treatment. Relief was already higher in patients before avoidance was available, and patients rated the pictures as more aversive. It does not show the authors’ account, that low confidence in avoidance makes omissions surprising and the relief reinforces avoidance. | Active |
| THEORY-914 v2 | In fear conditioning, extinction does not erase the original threat association but adds a competing inhibitory one, which is why extinguished fear can return with time, a change of context, an unsignalled aversive event or renewed pairing | Craske, Treanor, Conway, Zbozinek & Vervliet (2014), LIT-1500, read in full from the PMC author manuscript in NOTE-1137. The paper summarizes Bouton’s model and the four return-of-fear phenomena that support it, and translates them into exposure practice. The evidence is cited, not reported: the source is a clinical translation, and a promotion needs the primary literature. It does not show that exposure therapy in patients works by inhibitory learning alone. The authors allow that habituation also plays a part. | Proposed |
| THEORY-915 v2 | In Zorowitz, Momennejad and Daw’s simulations of a Markov decision process, an agent that evaluates actions as if it will fail to avoid danger at later steps, while in fact choosing optimally at each step, spreads threat value to states far from the danger and avoids early and widely, which reproduces qualitatively exaggerated threat appraisal, fear generalization and several laboratory findings associated with anxiety | Zorowitz, Momennejad & Daw (2020; preprint 2019), LIT-1496, read in full from the CC BY version of record in NOTE-1136. A decision-theoretic argument and value-iteration simulations with a β-pessimistic Bellman equation. The misbelief is about the agent’s own future control; the danger is represented correctly. No data are fitted. That learned values outlast correction of the misbelief is argued in the paper, not simulated, and is not part of this title. | Active |
| THEORY-917 v2 | Chou, Wilson and Smith read about eight computational studies of exploration in reward-based bandit tasks, mostly in sub-clinical samples, with mixed results and none replicated, as suggesting that directed exploration rises with trait or cognitive anxiety and falls with state or somatic anxiety; none they review links random exploration to anxiety | Chou, Wilson & Smith (preprint June 2024; NBR 2024), LIT-1483, read in full from the PsyArXiv preprint in NOTE-1127. A narrative review; the pattern is the authors’ reading of about eight studies with different tasks, models and anxiety measures, with one failed replication and one null. The authors hedge it with “may” and “many results could be seen to suggest”. | Active |
| THEORY-920 v2 | As Mancinelli and Bach’s systematic review reports it, rating it B, in three laboratory studies of healthy humans a signalled, costless avoidance response offered for a stimulus never paired with the aversive outcome was used, and withdrawing it raised expectancy of the outcome for that stimulus, though Xia et al. (2019) found no change in skin conductance or startle; every study signalled the response’s availability, which may itself have read as a danger cue | Mancinelli & Bach (preprint 2025; NBR 2026), LIT-1477, read in full in NOTE-1134. Rated B (“AR execution can propagate to CS-”, 3 studies: Cameron et al. 2022, Engelhard et al. 2015, Xia et al. 2019). The authors infer that people deduce danger without experiencing it, perhaps counterfactually, from having avoided; they also say the signal that avoidance is available may itself be read as a danger cue. | Active |
| THEORY-921 v2 | As Craske et al.’s 2014 review reports it, citing six studies and reporting no data of its own, how far fear falls during an extinction or exposure session, or across sessions, does not predict how much fear is expressed at follow-up, in animals, human laboratory samples and fearful, mostly analog, human samples | Craske et al. (2014), LIT-1500, read in full from the PMC author manuscript in NOTE-1137, citing six studies. The authors read it as “divergence in response systems”: fear expressed during exposure and the learning that exposure produces need not change together. That is the basis of their case against habituation-based exposure. The paper reports no data, and the cited studies are mostly analog samples. | Active |
| THEORY-922 v2 | Among 56 of 88 patients in one DBT intensive outpatient programme, kept because they finished a four-month cycle and gave enough diary data, skills-homework completion in months 1–3 correlated with larger falls in suicide and substance-use urges (r ≈ .35) and phone-coaching frequency with a larger fall in self-harm urges (r = .31); neither correlated with change in how often the behaviours occurred, and only homework separated patients with and without a target behaviour in month 4 | Edwards, Kober, Rinne, Griffin, Axelrod & Cooney (2021), LIT-1480, read in full in NOTE-1121. A chart and diary-card review: three of eight urge-change correlations with the two predictors significant, none with behaviour frequency; month-4 abstinence from all target behaviours went with more homework (91% against 80%, p = .02), not significantly with more coaching (p = .096). No correction for multiple comparisons, selected sample, no measure of skill use. | Active |
| THEORY-1179 | In an active-inference model of post-traumatic context inference, an overly precise prior that one is in a harmful context makes exploratory sampling look uninformative, so the agent attenuates the periphery, never receives the evidence that would correct the prior, and the belief sustains itself; lowering precision removes the symptoms without correcting the prior | The wide form THEORY-285 held before the eighth status review narrowed it, kept as a Proposed reading by the ADR-047 kind-1 sweep of 2026-10-30: the source asserts it, and THEORY-285, Active, is its evidence. Linson et al. (2025), LIT-983, recast post-traumatic stress as lost context disambiguation and offer the loop as its mechanism; their simulations show it once per phenotype, with unreported parameters, and fit no patient data. | Proposed |
| THEORY-1180 | In foraging tasks, higher stress or anxiety goes consistently with less exploration, and in one task with a predator to check for, people higher in somatic anxiety checked less and did worse, a reduction associated with greater aversion to detecting the predator | The wide form THEORY-907 held before the thirteenth status review narrowed it, kept as a Proposed reading by the ADR-047 kind-1 sweep of 2026-10-30: the source asserts it, and THEORY-907, Active, is its evidence. | Proposed |
| THEORY-1182 | Across seven computational learning studies selected without a systematic search, anxiety goes with altered adjustment of learning rate to uncertainty, mostly for aversive outcomes, while overall learning rate, choice consistency and outcome valuation show little relation to it | The wide form THEORY-897 held before the thirteenth status review narrowed it, kept as a Proposed reading by the ADR-047 kind-1 sweep of 2026-10-30: the source asserts it, and THEORY-897, Active, is its evidence. | Proposed |
| THEORY-1184 | In three laboratory studies of healthy humans, offering a costless avoidance response for a stimulus never paired with the aversive outcome led people to use it, and withdrawing the response then raised their expectancy of the outcome for that stimulus; signalling of the response is a confound | The wide form THEORY-920 held before the thirteenth status review narrowed it, kept as a Proposed reading by the ADR-047 kind-1 sweep of 2026-10-30: the source asserts it, and THEORY-920, Active, is its evidence. The old title’s clause “though not their skin conductance or startle in the one study that measured them” is not kept: it read more into the review than it says, and THEORY-920’s note of 2026-10-30 says why. | Proposed |
| THEORY-1186 | Across computational studies of exploration in reward-based bandit tasks, mostly in sub-clinical samples and not yet replicated, directed exploration tends to rise with trait or cognitive anxiety and to fall with state or somatic anxiety | The wide form THEORY-917 held before the thirteenth status review narrowed it, kept as a Proposed reading by the ADR-047 kind-1 sweep of 2026-10-30: the source asserts it, and THEORY-917, Active, is its evidence. The old title’s last clause, that random exploration shows no relation to anxiety, is not kept: the review reports only that no study links them, and THEORY-917’s note of 2026-10-30 says why. | Proposed |
| THEORY-1189 | In laboratory avoidance learning in healthy humans, an avoidance response that remains available during extinction persists, in some participants for hundreds of unpunished trials, and keeps expectancy of the aversive outcome higher than in people denied it; the more effective and the cheaper the response, the slower it extinguishes | The wide form THEORY-901 held before the thirteenth status review narrowed it, kept as a Proposed reading by the ADR-047 kind-1 sweep of 2026-10-30: the source asserts it, and THEORY-901, Active, is its evidence. | Proposed |
| THEORY-1190 | In a Markov decision process, an agent that evaluates actions as if it will fail to avoid danger at later steps, while in fact choosing optimally at each step, spreads threat value to states far from the danger and avoids early and widely, which reproduces qualitatively exaggerated threat appraisal, fear generalization and several laboratory findings associated with anxiety | The wide form THEORY-915 held before the thirteenth status review narrowed it, kept as a Proposed reading by the ADR-047 kind-1 sweep of 2026-10-30: the source asserts it, and THEORY-915, Active, is its evidence. Zorowitz, Momennejad and Daw (2020), LIT-1496, state it of Markov decision processes in general and show it in the environments they simulate. The inherited promote_when asks for data in people, which the paper leaves to future work. | Proposed |
| THEORY-1193 | How far fear falls during an extinction or exposure session, or across sessions, does not predict how much fear is expressed at follow-up, in animals, human laboratory samples and fearful human samples | The wide form THEORY-921 held before the fourteenth status review narrowed it, kept as a Proposed reading by the ADR-047 kind-1 sweep of 2026-10-30: the source asserts it, and THEORY-921, Active, is its evidence. | Proposed |
| THEORY-1320 | In Ntoumanis et al.’s meta-analysis of 73 SDT-informed health interventions, mostly randomized, the interventions raised perceived need support (g = 0.64), autonomy and competence satisfaction (0.37, 0.31), autonomous motivation (0.30) and health behaviour (0.45) by the end of the intervention, but not relatedness, controlled motivation or amotivation, and their small effect on psychological health (0.29) was gone at follow-up (0.14, ns); need frustration was not an outcome and mediation was not tested | Ntoumanis et al. (2020; issue 2021), LIT-1962, read in NOTE-1526 from the open-access PDF. Active as a statement of what the meta-analysis reports (Table 1, p. 222), with its sizes, intervals and k. It is the record’s experimental evidence that manipulating need support moves SDT’s proximal constructs; it is not evidence that need frustration is a process in psychopathology (THEORY-052). | Active |
| THEORY-1322 | In Belgian adolescents, need frustration measured by the twelve BPNSFS frustration items statistically absorbs most of the association between depressive and eating disorder symptoms: cross-sectionally their latent correlation falls from .50 to a non-significant .18, and in a two-wave latent change model their correlated change falls from .43 to .24; its mediating role is shown in correlated change over the same six months, not in temporal order | Campbell, Boone, Vansteenkiste and Soenens (2018), LIT-1964, read in NOTE-1533 from the early-view PDF on selfdeterminationtheory.org. Active as a statement of the reported models, checked against the text and Tables 1–2. It is the study THEORY-052 cites through LIT-561 p. 12 as the one longitudinal evidence for need frustration as transdiagnostic. It does not show that frustration precedes the symptoms, does not reach externalizing problems, and its measure is the one THEORY-1311 doubts. | Active |
| THEORY-1349 | In two cross-lagged panel studies of university students, a negatively worded self-report of need frustration predicted later depressive symptoms (standardized β .13 to .18 over three lags) and later negative affect, net of earlier depression and negative affect, while negative affect did not predict later depression; depression also predicted later need frustration at one lag of two | Levine et al. (2021), LIT-1974, read in NOTE-1510 from the version of record in PMC. Active as a statement of the reported paths, checked against Tables 2, 4 and 5. It does not say the frustration causes the depression: the models are traditional cross-lagged panels without random intercepts, so their lagged paths mix stable between-person differences, the reverse path was as large as the forward one at the first lag, and every variable is a self-report. | Active |