The claim
Faced with a normatively relevant discrepancy, an agent or organization needs three things for it to make a difference:
- Legibility. The discrepancy becomes recognizable through the distinctions the organization draws (TERM-064).
- Volitional efficacy. A corresponding demand can influence action through the organization’s will-organization (TERM-023).
- Correctability. A fitting revision can be carried out, found, authorized, coordinated and executed within deadline and resources (TERM-085).
Call normative efficacy the realized ability of a normatively relevant distinction to change an organization’s behaviour or governing standards. It can fail along any of the three paths. So an agent can be sincere, well informed and able to act, and still not act on a commitment:
- the reason never becomes legible (epistemic blockage);
- it becomes legible and is not given authority (volitional blockage);
- it is given authority and no revision can be executed in time.
This is CLAIM-349’s split of access, authority and action, carried from an organization’s own signals to normative demands.
Histories available and histories required
Separate:
- 𝓗_exec(O, W, Λ; B, T): the histories the agent can realize through its actual organization O, will-organization W and legibility apparatus Λ, under budget B and horizon T;
- 𝓗_N: the histories that satisfy an independently specified standard N.
𝓗_exec ∩ 𝓗_N is the set of norm-satisfying histories open to the agent as it actually is. Two cautions:
- A nonempty intersection does not show the agent will choose such a history. Availability is not choice. Resolve (CLAIM-344) and the volitional path are what make an available history the chosen one.
- An empty intersection does not show the agent is beyond criticism. Its earlier actions may have destroyed the capacities required. An intervention can make its own correction costlier or unreachable (CLAIM-464).
The second caution ties historical responsibility to the record’s resource-bounded account of what futures remain reachable (CLAIM-475).
What it does not say
- That any of the three justifies the demand or the revision. A legible, effective, executable revision can be wrong. Viability does not establish what ought to persist (CLAIM-075), and endorsing a motive does not justify it.
- That the three come in a fixed order. Like the achievements of CLAIM-474, they form no necessary sequence. An organization can have executable corrective machinery for discrepancies it cannot see.
- Who has the authority to decide that a change is warranted. That is QUESTION-364’s question: endogenous governance, historically continuous authorization and legitimate authority are three things.
Note of 2026-10-31: a legibility category that is also the refusal, and responsibility as incorporation
Two of the readings filed on this date bear on this claim.
- One label does the work of legibility and of refusal. In Bencherki (2017; LIT-1901, read in NOTE-1482, pp. 787–788) military spouses ask for a newsletter on daycare, dental care and pensions. The base commander reads every item as “political activity”, which is forbidden on the base. The demands are legible, but only under a category that denies them authority. Bencherki: “such a label seems to be the only organ available to the army’s body to capture these actions”. In this claim’s terms that is volitional blockage achieved through the distinctions that make a demand legible. It is not the epistemic blockage of a demand never seen. This claim says the three achievements can fail separately. The case shows a way they can fail together: the classification that makes a demand recognizable can also be the reason it is refused.
- The parent’s responsibility lacks the step this claim says is missing. Bencherki, Brummans and Vézy say “people become responsible as they incorporate/integrate (or deny the incorporation/integration of) the actions of others into their own becoming, which enables those others to continue their individuation” (LIT-1902, p. 1366). That places responsibility in granting another’s demand efficacy in one’s own organization, this claim’s volitional path. The paper gives no standard by which a demand ought to be incorporated, and this claim says none of the three achievements supplies one. Bencherki (2017) needs such a standard to call the army’s taking of the women’s daycare work “usurpation” (pp. 791–792). Its theory disclaims one (THEORY-1285).
No status, title or warrant changes.
Note of 2026-11-01: the three achievements in one mind
Metzinger’s work on mind-wandering (LIT-1942, LIT-1941) has instances of two of this claim’s separations within one person. Same structure, not shown same mechanism: the discrepancy is being off task, not a normative demand on an organization.
- Legible, and no volitional efficacy. Noticing that one has been mind-wandering can itself start a second episode: “Oops, I have just been daydreaming again!” leads to “another train of thought about having regained meta-awareness”, with “a new phenomenal UI … but the functional properties characterizing M-autonomy are not realized” (LIT-1942, p. 14).
- Correction without legibility. “Successful inhibition can be an entirely subpersonal process” (LIT-1942, p. 13).
- An order at the personal level. Meta-awareness is “a necessary precondition for second-order mental action” (LIT-1941, p. 277). This claim says the three form no necessary sequence. Metzinger asserts one for deliberate control in one mind, and allows correction without it below the personal level, which is consistent with the claim if the claim’s “volitional efficacy” includes subpersonal correction.
Metzinger’s condition for volitional efficacy is not legibility of the discrepancy but the agent’s representation of its own capacity to act on it. That is a different variable, filed as QUESTION-367.
No status, title or warrant changes.