1 min read
| Status | Active |
| Tags | agency, society-and-governance |
| Line | will-organization |
| Used by | CLAIM-057 — Precedence, jurisdiction and suspension can vary independently, CLAIM-086 — A constraint may govern conduct without governing the conditions under which it remains authoritative, CLAIM-156 — Mindfulness integrates a population of interests by changing which of them may act, and not only by changing what they value: noticing an impulse as an impulse suspends the step from its momentary dominance to its control of action, and that step needs no change in the discount curves, CLAIM-283 — The precedence a motive claims over action and the authority the rest of the organization grants it are different quantities: a motive can claim control without receiving it, and be granted control it does not claim, CLAIM-367 — Whether a training-time regulatory condition belongs to a network depends on which unit is individuated for the training dynamics and whose jurisdiction governs the updates; in conventional training most of that governance falls to the optimizer–model–data system, so a condition of training is not thereby a condition of the network, CLAIM-410 — Removing a constraint on an organization's members does not move it along one scale of more or less governance: it changes a profile of who holds rule-making, monitoring, enforcement, appeal and revision, in which the authority the constraint held can be eliminated, distributed or transferred, and the members' first-order options and their share in revising the conditions of their action can move in opposite directions, CLAIM-442 — Frijda's emotion and the potential account's system valence sit on opposite sides of the gap between the precedence a motive claims and the authority it is granted: an emotion, action readiness claiming control precedence, is a claim, a perspective's valence is read on its claims, and the system's valence is read on what the negotiation grants, so a change in grants with the claims fixed, as mindfulness is said to make, changes the system's valence and leaves the perspectives' emotions and valences as they were |
| Cited as “complements” by | TERM-094 — action readiness, with control precedence, in Frijda's sense: a state of preparation for action, not a representation of a desirable state, that claims control over behaviour by persisting until an end state, resuming after interruption, capturing attention and taking priority over other actions |
| Cited as “uses” by | ARG-051 — Mind-wandering, read as Metzinger reads it, is an individual-scale case in which a capacity the agent keeps, veto over its own mental processes, loses and regains efficacy through a change in a condition of efficacy and not in the competing processes, so it is a further instance of the conditions of efficacy governing which regime acts, the first in the record for suspension in one mind |
Not a ranking of rules. A formally absolute rule can have little practical authority if another process controls entry into its domain. The distinction came out of the Fraenkel discussion (U63) and is what CLAIM-057 and CLAIM-086 are stated in.