Topics — What a work is about. Nucleation holds whatever reading the owner files here, whether or not an Anthology of the SOTA topic could also hold it; instruction for ML practice belongs to the anthology (ADR-048). The words are seeded from the clusters the reading-time triage of 2026-09-25 found, and grow by decision.
Pragmatics — language in use — speech acts and illocutionary force, assertion and common ground, presupposition, dynamic and update semantics, footing and stance in discourse, and probabilistic models of speakers and listeners (rational speech acts); what an utterance does, beyond what it says (ADR-034).
20 of 547 CLAIM documents. Back to the full index.
| # | Title | Summary | Status |
|---|---|---|---|
| CLAIM-129 v3 | A factorization recovers only the structure visible in the relations it is fitted to, so a topic can survive a transformation that changes the communicative act, and a kind must be tested against probe families chosen for their bearing on the act | The assistant’s, at A210 §5 after the owner’s U58, and again at A214 §3–§4. It recurs from U56 (A203 §37) to U60 (A218 H3), so it gets a code. It is CLAIM-004’s distinction between changing the frame and changing the act, in a factorization, and TERM-014’s relativity to a family of measurements, stated for factorizations. It does not say lexical structure is irrelevant to the act, or that a richer factorization cannot capture acts. | Proposed |
| CLAIM-130 v4 | Telling an interpreter about a communicative situation, do(I = a), is a different intervention from changing the situation, do(S = s): only a do(S) intervenes on the relations that would constitute an act, and in a vignette or rating study every manipulation is a do(I) | The owner proposed Pearl’s do() at U41, and A129 §1 drew the distinction. It recurs at A151, A191, A203, A214 and A218. CLAIM-127 is about where the index sits in the formalism; this claim is about what an experiment manipulates. The sharp edge: in a vignette or rating study every manipulation is a do(I). | Active |
| CLAIM-147 v2 | A trope is a family of observational profiles joined by admissible transformations around a core of preserved relations, so trope instances can separate structural preservation from pragmatic preservation | A155, at U44, after the owner proposed TV Tropes. A trope is taken to be neither an invariant token pattern nor a semantic label, but a family of observational profiles related by recasting, adaptation, inversion, subversion and parody. Comparing such families tests whether relational measures track communicative identity where surface similarity fails. A178 made it Study B; A191 §8 gave it five manipulations. The record objects that the analysis is Propp’s and Lévi-Strauss’s, and that the catalogue cannot validate it (CLAIM-145). | Proposed |
| CLAIM-151 v5 | Which communicative act an utterance performs is partly constituted by its relations to participant roles, norms and expected uptake, so a transformation that changes those relations can change the act and not only its realization | The assistant at A187 §3, after the owner’s U52 question about ontic structural realism, restated at A191 §1, A203 §3, A214 §13 and A218 §2. It is argued for social acts, and its argument stops there; the record’s scope does not (version 3), and the general frame is CLAIM-477, of which this is a domain case. Its “representational against constitutive transformation” is CLAIM-004’s distinction re-derived, which it cites. Searle’s status functions (LIT-482) are the nearer held prior art, and “moderate OSR” is the wrong name for it. | Proposed |
| CLAIM-160 v3 | Data written for a potential future receiver has its intended meaning fixed by the write: even if it is never read, what it was meant to say was settled when it was stored | The owner’s claim of 2026-10-11, in their words: “data is written with a potential future receiver in mind. even if the data is never read, its intended meaning was fixed by the write.” It separates when identity is fixed (at the write, relative to a projected receiver) from when fidelity is measured (at a read, relative to an actual one), which the line had left unsettled. It does not say what a text means to a given reader is fixed. | Proposed |
| CLAIM-171 | A stored text means only what its readings make of it: the writer’s projected receiver is one more reading, so an unread text has possible meanings and no fixed one | The record’s anticipated reception-side objection to the owner’s storage claim. Its nearest support in the line is CLAIM-111, a text supporting a distribution over possible communicative situations. No reception theory is held or read. Open: the reply (the joke changed for the reader, not in what it was made to do) works only if the writer’s frame is itself recoverable, and that is QUESTION-031’s problem. | Proposed |
| CLAIM-214 | The distribution-over-situations criterion compares each language’s own listener posterior, so it needs no correspondence of alternative sets; that a literal rendering can fail it is the criterion detecting a lost implicature, and a target language may admit no rendering that passes | The record’s reply, on 2026-10-10, to CLAIM-236. CLAIM-111’s criterion is P_o(z | c_o, u_o) ≈ P_t(τ_z(z) | c_t, u_t). On the rational-speech-act model each posterior is computed with its own language’s alternatives, so comparing the posteriors needs no map between the alternative sets. The objection’s worked case is right, and it shows the criterion rejecting a rendering that keeps the literal content and loses a scalar implicature. Active, because it is read off the criterion’s form and checked by arithmetic. It does not say the model is right or that the criterion applies to poems. | Active |
| CLAIM-217 v2 | For a communicative kind, the standard of sufficiency is the uptake of competent participants who know the standings and norms in play: a defeasible standard, overridden only where the act’s other constituents diverge from the judges’ verdicts, so a probe family is tested against it, and a kind outruns the families coarser than that standard and the judges only through those constituents | The record’s reply, on 2026-10-10, to CLAIM-206, and the argument CLAIM-247 found missing. Calling a probe family insufficient (CLAIM-142, CLAIM-135) presupposes a standard beyond it. For an act partly constituted by uptake (CLAIM-151), competent participants’ uptake is that standard, and since version 2 a defeasible one: CLAIM-241 is conceded, so the verdicts yield where the act’s other constituents diverge from them. The kind’s extension is the class the standard fixes, and analysts’ families are insufficient when coarser. No test needs a kind that outruns every family. A proposal, resting on a Proposed premise. It does not touch CLAIM-139’s ontological clause, which the programme does not test. | Proposed |
| CLAIM-221 v2 | The relational-constitution thesis’s defeat condition describes a standard rival the record holds no counter for, intention-based accounts of illocution, which plausibly meet it for every act in the four-speakers case except the institutional one | Found in the record’s audit of the line on 2026-10-10 (structure lens); no turn of the exchange raises it. CLAIM-151 is defeated by a held account that individuates teasing, reproach and reprimand by the utterance plus speaker-internal states. That is the intention-based line of Grice, Strawson and Bach and Harnish, none of whom the record holds. On it CASE-018’s friend, parent and comedian differ in communicative intention, and only the judge needs norms, which Searle (LIT-482) already supplies. The record’s own model for CLAIM-111 is of this family. The objection is open; it would narrow CLAIM-151 to institutional acts unless an argument from uptake meets it. | Proposed |
| CLAIM-227 | No validated measure of footing or stance exists in the record, and the one repeated assignment of footing, the analyst’s own, changed between passes | Found in the record’s audit of the line on 2026-10-10 (empirical lens); no turn of the exchange raises it. Footing and stance are the observables the central theses turn on, yet the only footing judgement made twice of the same texts, the assistant’s labelling of its own four refrains, changed between A38 and A39 without comment (CASE-012), and no design gives judges a definition, a response format, a reliability target or a validation against a known contrast. Granted, because it is a reading of the record. It does not say footing cannot be measured. | Active |
| CLAIM-234 v3 | The record’s iterated-learning readings bear on lexical, structural and functional transmission, and none measures stance, footing or speech-act function along a chain | Found in the record’s audit of the line on 2026-10-10 (empirical lens); no turn of the exchange raises it. CLAIM-068 extends iterated learning “to speaker footing and communicative conventions”, and no reading the record holds measures a stance or a speech-act function under transmission. Bartlett is unread, and the transmission-chain work on social and affective content is not in the record. Granted: it is a reading of the record. It is minor because CLAIM-068 is off the central chains, and it does not say stances are not stabilized by transmission. | Superseded — by ARG-027 |
| CLAIM-236 v2 | Under the rational-speech-act model the distribution-over-situations thesis grounds on, a form’s interpretation depends on what else the speaker could have said, so matching source and target posteriors needs a correspondence of alternative sets that translation changes and no entry names | Found in the record’s audit of the line on 2026-10-10 (empirical lens); no turn of the exchange raises it. CLAIM-111 makes a translation faithful when the target’s posterior over communicative situations matches the source’s, and its worked model, THEORY-172, makes that posterior depend on the set of alternative utterances. A translation replaces the source language’s alternatives with the target’s, so a rendering with the same literal content can carry a different posterior. Granted, because it follows from the model as the record states it. It does not say the model is wrong or CLAIM-111 false. | Rejected |
| CLAIM-241 v2 | Partial constitution by uptake makes competent participants’ uptake a defeasible standard of a communicative kind, not the criterion: where the act’s other constituents, such as its institutional conditions, diverge from how even informed participants take it, their verdicts can be wrong, and a standard must say whose competence counts, for which class of acts, and how divided verdicts are combined, which a majority does not | The interlocutor’s first refinement at U62 (A240), with its row on CLAIM-217, pressed at full strength. CLAIM-217 moves from “partly constituted by … expected uptake” to “the judges … are the criterion”. Partial constitution gives uptake a vote, not the last word, so where the act’s other constituents diverge from informed uptake the verdicts can be wrong. The claim also names no rule for combining divided verdicts and no class of acts. Open: answering it means saying whether a defeasible standard re-opens the horn CLAIM-217 closed. It does not say uptake is not a standard. | Active |
| CLAIM-242 v3 | The use-level counterpart of Saussure’s value is an utterance’s contrast with the alternatives its speaker could have used in context; values do not cross between languages, which is why fidelity is graded transport through an anchored correspondence rather than identity of value | The record’s reply, on 2026-10-10, to CLAIM-254. It grants the objection’s premises: value is internal to one language state, and it is a fact of langue, while the line’s observables are facts of use. It denies the conclusion. What the premise rules out is identity of value across languages, which the line does not claim (CLAIM-106), and transport through a correspondence fixed from outside both systems is what CLAIM-082’s own qualification already requires. At the level of use, contrast with alternatives is the rational-speech-act model’s premise (THEORY-172) and Bergen, Goodman and Levy’s finding (LIT-809). Saussure becomes precedent, not premise. A proposal, not a refutation. | Proposed |
| CLAIM-255 v2 | Intending to perform an act, performing it and being recognized as having performed it are distinct, coupled variables: intended meaning is fixed at production, the act partly by roles, standing and norms, and recognition by uptake, so competent uptake is constitutive for some acts, evidential for others and irrelevant to the existence of still others | From the interlocutor’s reading of PR #121 and its reconciliation, relayed by the owner on 2026-10-12, on the first open tension (CLAIM-160 against CLAIM-151 and CLAIM-217). It gives each claim its own object rather than picking one. Proposed and not adopted: the owner has not taken it. | Proposed |
| CLAIM-298 v2 | A frame can change a judgement by changing which of an interpreter’s stored distinctions are reachable, without supplying any evidence about what is being judged | A20’s proposed claim, after the owner tied addressing to anchoring at U20, and A19’s “addressing conditions”. Its psychological form is the selective-accessibility account of anchoring, and the readings of 2026-10-15 weaken it: Strack and Mussweiler (1997, read) infer accessibility from moderations and latencies without measuring it, and their model lets the same retrieved knowledge push a judgement either way; Harris et al. (2019, read) find the most direct measure of the accessibility step does not replicate and cannot detect priming at all. The retrieval step is inferred, not shown. The mechanism the record holds, attention as sparse distributed memory (LIT-269), is a model, not evidence about judges. The extension to communication in general is the record’s and is not shown. | Proposed |
| CLAIM-304 | A rendering can keep a distinction recoverable in principle and make it infeasible to recover: if pseudorandom generators exist, a uniformly random bit can be encoded so that an unbounded receiver recovers it except with probability at most 2⁻⁽ⁿ⁺¹⁾, while no efficient receiver does non-negligibly better than chance | A14’s first failure mode, computational inaccessibility, and A18’s fourth candidate: “Recoverable in principle ≠ recoverable within budget.” CLAIM-199 shows a garbling can help a bounded receiver. This is the other direction: a nearly lossless rendering can defeat every efficient one. The construction is the record’s, from CLAIM-302’s witness; A18 asked for one and warned against “a vague appeal to an inverse being hard”. | Active |
| CLAIM-336 v6 | The pragmatic-transport and will-organization lines describe one model, an organization of operators that act on a shared interpretive state under a context while allocating one another’s influence: a frame is the context under which operators act, a judgement is the response they yield, an action-generating regime is an operator or coalition, and a will-organization is the dynamics that allocates influence among them | The owner’s, U2 of the exchange of 2026-10-16: the pragmatic-transport model and the will-organization model are “both manifestations of the same underlying model”. The mapping is the assistant’s, A6, filed at the owner’s request (“address the still open stuff”). At U8 the owner endorsed it as filed (“Yes, as filed”). It reads both lines into CLAIM-297’s operator model. The sharp edge: it says the lines share one model, not that either line’s results transfer to the other unchanged. Each mapping is a hypothesis until a result on one line is shown to hold, through it, on the other. | Proposed |
| CLAIM-450 v5 | Three standards for a communicative distinction come apart: statistical distinguishability of an interpreter’s response profiles, measured locally by the Fisher metric and never raised by a parameter-independent garbling; usability by a bounded receiver, which a transformation can raise; and pragmatic efficacy in the act; and where response models are singular, as Watanabe’s theory treats, a missing response can come from an absent attempt or an unresponsive receiver alike, and only intervention or later dynamics separate them | The owner’s, 2026-10-24, after setting aside the belief–knowledge distinction: “forget about that distinction then and let’s connect back to the communicative act stuff and amari/watanabe theory”. Worked through the same day (workbench entry of 2026-10-24, U27). Amari’s geometry and Watanabe’s singular learning are given different jobs in one modelling architecture, alongside bounded legibility and the communicative-act account, rather than read as rival characterizations. | Active |
| CLAIM-496 | Agreement between routes of translation is a measure of coherence, not of fidelity, and the two are independent: a rendering that sends every source utterance to one output makes direct and relay transport agree exactly while a receiver who could tell a promise from a prediction with no error is left at chance, and two routes that keep the act and differ in register disagree completely while losing nothing the act-identification task needs | From A4 and A5 of the exchange “Paper assessment” (2026-10-29), where the assistant carried LIT-1820’s comparison of alternative paths over to translation and then warned that “path agreement is a coherence criterion, not a fidelity criterion”. The constructions are the record’s. It does not say path discrepancy is uninformative: it says it measures something CLAIM-259’s directed loss does not, and conversely. | Active |